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INTRODUCTION
Courts frequently observe that neither the common law nor the First
Amendment' will shield the media from liability for crimes or torts commit-
ted during the course of newsgathering. 2 A highly publicized legal contro-
versy has, however, prompted renewed debate on this issue. On January 22,
1997, in Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,3 a North Carolina federal
I The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amend-
ment has been made applicable to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
2 See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that harassment of
celebrity plaintiff by "paparazzo" was not immunized by First Amendment); see also
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment does
not afford reporters a privilege against testifying before grand jury investigations into the
criminal conduct of their sources); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249-50 (9th
Cir. 1971) (holding media defendant liable for common law tort of invasion of privacy).
3 Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
For previously reported decisions in this case see Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 959-60 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (explaining decision to exclude publica-
tion damages on causation grounds); 951 F. Supp. 1233, 1234-35 (M.D.N.C. 1996)
(striking defendants' equitable defenses of unclean hands and in pari delicto); 951 F. Supp.
1224 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment on claims of
breach of fiduciary duty and claims of unfair and deceptive trade practices); 951 F. Supp.
1217, 1224 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment on
claims of fraud, trespass, negligent supervision, civil conspiracy, and respondeat superior
for trespass); 946 F. Supp. 420 (M.D.N.C. 1996), af'd, 116 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 1997)
(mem.) (dismissing plaintiff's action seeking a declaration that it owned copyrights to
videotapes made by defendants' undercover journalists and also dismissing a claim for
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jury awarded the plaintiff $5.5 million in punitive damages against the media
defendant, ABC, for fraud, trespass, and breach of employee duty of loy-
alty. 4 ABC exposed itself to this liability by instructing its investigators to
conceal their media connections, gain employment in plaintiff's supermar-
kets, and surreptitiously film alleged unsanitary meat handling procedures.
Part of the footage that the investigators obtained aired nationally on ABC's
PrimeTime Live program on November 5, 1992. 5
Although some of the Food Lion jurors apparently thought that punitive
damages of $5.5 million would not mean much to a media giant like ABC, 6
many commentators were stunned by the size of the award, 7 which brought
the case to the public's immediate attention. 8 Many decried the danger to in-
vestigatory journalism, 9 as well as to techniques used to test for abuses
ranging from racial discrimination to substandard restaurant cuisine. 10 The
damages for copyright infringement); 887 F. Supp. 811, 824-25 (M.D.N.C. 1995)
(dismissing claims based on violations of federal wiretapping statutes; declining to dismiss
state law claims of fraud, trespass, and civil conspiracy; deferring claims of negligent su-
pervision, respondeat superior liability, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and
unfair and deceptive trade practices; and holding that defendants' acts did not constitute
pattern of racketeering as required to establish RICO violation and that plaintiff could not
recover reputational damages resulting from broadcast).
4 See Barry Meier, Jury Says ABC Owes Damages of $5.5 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 1997, at Al.
5 For an excellent summary of the facts surrounding the Food Lion controversy, see
Amy Singer, Food, Lies, and Videotape, AM. LAW., Apr. 1997, at 56.
6 See id. at 65 (stating that the Food Lion jurors felt that the punitive damages
amounted to no more than "a slap on the wrist").
7 See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, "Food Lion" Endangers Muckrakers, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 17,
1997, at A15 ("Constitutional principles are plainly implicated in any punitive damages
award of this magnitude. The 4000-to-1 ratio used by the jury in awarding punitive dam-
ages seems facially inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent ruling in this area [in]
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore .... "); James C. Goodale, Killing the Messenger,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 7, 1997, at 3 (arguing that the award of $5.5 million in Food Lion "is best
viewed as a case of killing the messenger for delivering a truthful message"); Floyd Stuart
Taylor, Jr., Chilled to the Bone, RECORDER, Feb. 5, 1997, at 5 ("[Plunitive damages are
not the right remedy for journalistic bad taste-certainly not when (as here) the undercover
news-gathering is not clearly illegal, and the plaintiff does not prove any falsehood or
defamation.").
8 See Meier, supra note 4, at A1 (reporting the award of damages in Food Lion the day
after the jury returned with its verdict in this "closely watched case" that had "attracted
broad attention in journalistic and legal circles").
9 See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 7, at A15 ("The jury decision in Food Lion... poses
a genuine, real-life, major-league threat to the ability of the press to gather news and re-
port it accurately to the public.").
10 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 7, at 5 (arguing that the Food Lion verdict "might also
lead to liability for the types of deception that are more routinely employed not only by
civil rights testers, but also by restaurant critics and others who conceal their true identi-
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investigatory media and its defenders would, however, have had far greater
cause for concern if the trial judge had permitted the jury to consider Food
Lion's publication-predicated tort claims.1 The airing of the story forced
Food Lion to close 88 stores and lay off more than 1000 employees, 12 and
caused the value of its stock to plummet by nearly one half.13 Food Lion
originally sought compensatory damages of $5.5 billion, 14 but following the
trial judge's instructions, the jury awarded Food Lion only $1402 in com-
pensation. 15
To the relief of the investigatory media and its defenders, the Food Lion
trial court subsequently granted ABC's post-trial motion of remittitur to the
extent of reducing the punitive damages award to $315,000.16 Nevertheless,
both the punitive and compensatory damage awards in Food Lion continue to
raise significant, unresolved legal issues. The Food Lion court applied the
Supreme Court's recent ruling in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore17 to
reduce the punitive damages award.' 8 Under BMW, the first and most sig-
nificant of the factors to be weighed is the "reprehensibility" of the tort. 19 It
is, however, unclear whether in assessing reprehensibility it is appropriate to
consider the tortfeasor's intention of exposing matters of serious public con-
ties or purposes to gain information").
11 The trial judge rejected Food Lion's motions to submit publication damages to the
jury both at a preliminary stage of the litigation and also subsequently in a ruling following
the verdict of liability but prior to the trial on damages. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 966 (M.D.N.C. 1997); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 823 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
12 See Singer, supra note 5, at 58.
13 See id.
14 See Food Lion, 964 F. Supp. at 965 (noting that Food Lion claimed total publication
damages of around $5.5 billion).
15 See Jury Orders $1402 Award to Food Lion; Punitive Damages Issue Lies Ahead in
CBS Case, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1996, at A7.
16 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 984 F. Supp. 923, 940 (M.D.N.C.
1997). Food Lion consented to the reduction in damages rather than face a new trial on
this issue; see Paul Nowell, ABC Appeals Food Lion Verdict, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct, 27,
1997, available in 1997 WL 4889751 (noting that Food Lion consented to remittitur of
punitive damages).
17 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
18 See id. at 1592 (holding that excessive punitive damages violate due process).
19 See id. The jury might have had grounds for viewing the defendants' behavior as
"reprehensible" because of evidence suggesting that the ABC reporters "staged" various
incidents for the purpose of making Food Lion's working conditions appear to be unsani-
tary. See Food Lion, 964 F. Supp. at 963. These incidents included failure to throw away
rotten food, failure to clean a meat saw, and even sabotage of a hot water heater needed to
clean equipment. See id. Notably, Judge Tilley ruled that none of the allegedly staged in-
cidents could, under North Carolina or South Carolina law, be deemed to be the proximate
cause of the $5.5 billion publication damages that Food Lion alleged. See id. at 964.
.510 [Vol. 78:507
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cern to public scrutiny. Moreover, the standards set forth under BMW are
general rules applicable to cases in which no fundamental rights are at
stake. 20 Because First Amendment issues are implicated in Food Lion and
other cases involving punitive damage awards for newsgathering torts, the
standard of review should arguably be more rigorous. 21
Food Lion argued that its enormous financial losses were proximately
caused by the PrimeTime Live broadcast and should properly have been in-
cluded in its compensatory damage award, 22 a position that does find some
support in common law precedent. 23 Although Food Lion did not sue ABC
for defamation,24 it argued that given the nature of the defendants' conduct,
it should be permitted to recover for damages to its reputation without having
to prove the falsity of the broadcast, let alone ABC's knowledge of any fal-
sity. 25 This approach to damage assessment would, however, circumvent the
20 Where a fundamental liberty is not burdened, due process requires only that the law
be rationally related to the furtherance of a valid or legitimate government purpose. See
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996) ("[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a'suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it
bears a rational relation to some legitimate end."); United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938) (stating that legislation is to be presumed constitu-
tional where it "rests upon some rational basis" but noting that this presumption may be
narrower where constitutional rights are at stake). But see Food Lion, 984 F. Supp. at 923,
932 (holding that ABC was not entitled to any First Amendment immunity from punitive
damages).
21 See infra Part III.E.
22 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 822 (M.D.N.C.
1995).
23 See infra Part III.D. 1.
24 Food Lion asserts that it did not sue for defamation because the statute of limitations
had run before it could gather evidence sufficient to meet its burden of proving that ABC
acted with "actual malice." See Paul Nowell, ABC Challenges Punitive Damages Awarded
to Food Lion, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4857260; Singer,
supra note 5, at 58; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)
(requiring public figure defamation plaintiffs to prove "actual malice"). Outside of court,
however, Food Lion continues to contest the truthfulness of the PrimeTime Live broadcast,
asserting that it unsuccessfully attempted to add a libel claim to its lawsuit in 1995. See
Singer, supra note 5, at 65. In response,, ABC has challenged Food Lion to lift the
"confidential" designation on internal documents that ABC obtained from Food Lion in
discovery. See id. ABC contends that these documents support its claim that the broadcast
was substantially true. See id. Food Lion claims that ABC depicted it in a false light by
suggesting that the televised footage of unsanitary food-handling practices represented
company policy rather than violations thereof. See id. at 61. Food Lion further emphasizes
that these were incidental abuses found at only three of nearly 900 Food Lion stores; that
ABC selectively edited some 45 hours worth of tapes to produce a ten-minute segment de-
signed to show Food Lion in the worst possible light; and, most significantly, that the re-
porters staged certain incidents. See id. at 60-61.
25 See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 820-21.
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protections afforded by the First Amendment to the publication itself,26 in-
cluding the requirement that defendants prove actual malice to establish
defamation claims as required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.27 Food
Lion argued that newsgathering torts "taint" the ensuing speech and divest it
of the First Amendment protections that would otherwise shield it.28
Was the punitive damage award excessive? Should Food Lion have been
compensated for the publication damages? The two questions are interrelated
because it was the great disparity between Food Lion's punitive and compen-
satory awards that made the former especially vulnerable to reversal under
BMW.29 The size of the punitive damage award suggests that although the
jury was able to segregate and exclude publication damages from the com-
pensatory damage award, it may to some degree have unconsciously factored
the publication effects into the punitive damage award.
If these critical questions with regard to the propriety of damages in Food
Lion remain unresolved, so too does the very issue of ABC's tort liability.
Should the media be liable at all for newsgathering torts of the kind that ABC
and its reporters committed? Might not such investigatory activity be deemed
to be privileged under state common law or, alternatively, protected by the
First Amendment? 30
Although the Supreme Court has not yet squarely addressed the constitu-
26 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that civil liability
could not be imposed on a newspaper that published the name of a sexual assault victim in
violation of a state privacy law when the information was truthful and lawfully obtained
and where more narrowly tailored means were available to protect the interest at stake);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347, 349 (1974) (holding that states are free
to define the standard of liability applicable in defamation suits brought by private indi-
viduals but that an award of punitive or presumed damages must be based on a knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88
(1967) (holding that states cannot constitutionally permit "false light" invasion of privacy
claims arising out of publication of matters of public interest to proceed unless they are
published either with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit states from awarding defamation damages to public offi-
cials except in cases where the official can prove that the defamatory statements were
made with "actual malice").
27 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
28 See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 820-21.
29 The "disproportionality" of the punitive damage award to the compensatory damage
award in Food Lion is staggering, nearly 4000:1. In BMW, the Court held that a ratio of
500:1 was unconstitutionally disproportionate. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
116 S. Ct. 1589, 1602-03 (1996). (describing a 500:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages as "breathtaking"). Even after punitive damages were remitted in BMW, the pu-
nitive award still stood at a nearly 225:1 ratio with respect to the compensatory damages
award.
30 See infra Part I.
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tional issue, it has held that the First Amendment does not provide the media
with any special immunity from the application of state contract and promis-
sory estoppel rules. 31 It has also suggested in dicta that the same would be
true as to state tort laws of general applicability. 32 Lower court decisions
have generally rejected the idea of extending either First Amendment protec-
tion or common law privilege to newsgathering torts.
33
Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals took
a very different tack in J.H. Desnick, M.D., Eye Services, Ltd. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc. ,34 a 1995 decision involving the same defendant and similar
claims as in Food Lion. In Desnick, ABC exposed itself to liability when, in
the course of gathering material for a PrimeTime Live broadcast, it sent
"test" patients carrying hidden cameras into clinics where opthalmologists
were suspected of performing unnecessary cataract surgery. 35 Noting that
most of the precedents had involved trespass and intrusion into private homes
rather than businesses, 36 and construing state tort law narrowly, 37 the court
dismissed the fraud and trespass claims.38 The Desnick court's innovative
approach of reading the torts small and distinguishing between the home and
the workplace as targets of surreptitious media investigation was rejected in
Food Lion. Reasoning that hiring employees is different from accepting pa-
tients or other customers, the trial judge in Food Lion distinguished Food
Lion from Desnick and declined to dismiss the fraud and trespass com-
plaints.39
This Article argues that the focus of the debate should not be on limiting
media liability for newsgathering torts, but rather on preventing the award of
31 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (holding that the First
Amendment does not bar the application of state promissory estoppel law to the press).
32 See, e.g., id. at 669 ("[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First Amend-
ment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability
to gather and report the news."); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972) ("The
[First] Amendment does not reach so far as to override the interest of the public in ensur-
ing that neither reporter nor source is invading the rights of other citizens through repre-
hensible conduct forbidden to all other persons.").
33 See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding
that the First Amendment provides the press with no immunity from liability in tort); Le
Mistral, Inc. v. CBS, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1978) (holding that the First Amend-
ment does not insulate the media from tort liability and that, under state law, punitive
damages are a permissible sanction when there is "willful or intentional misdoing, or
reckless indifference equivalent thereto").
34 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
35 See id. at 1348.
36 See id. at 1352-53.
37 See id. at 1352-55.
38 See id.




excessive damages for such torts. It urges courts to recognize a First
Amendment immunity from excessive damages, one that is broadly analo-
gous to the protection the First Amendment extends to alleged defamations
relating to matters of public concern.4° The Article takes the position that
under certain conditions, the award of punitive damages for newsgathering
torts should be barred entirely. It also argues that publication damages should
be excluded from the assessment of compensatory damages for the underly-
ing newsgathering tort and that any award of compensatory damages be lim-
ited to "actual injuries" sustained from the tort proper. 41
The proposed damage limitation model illuminates some significant limi-
tations of, and incongruities in, current First Amendment doctrines. 42 The
Article examines the Supreme Court's ruling in Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co. 43 and rejects the argument that Cohen provides support for the proposi-
tion that the publication of information resulting from newsgathering torts be
viewed as constitutionally "tainted." The approach in Cohen is distinguish-
able because that case involved a promissory estoppel claim rather than a
non-criminal newsgathering tort. The Article also examines First Amend-
ment doctrine that prevents courts from circumventing the constitutionalized
defamation rules of Sullivan and Gertz44-a doctrine that the Seventh Circuit
applied in Desnickt 5 and that the Food Lion court invoked in order to shield
ABC from liability for publication damages. 46 The reach of this doctrine is
potentially so expansive that many judges do not appear comfortable resort-
ing to it unless some nexus to classic defamation exists, such as falsity or
injury to reputation. Thus, challenged speech that looks more like defamation
might receive more judicial protection than speech which does not involve
any hint of defamation.
The Article concludes that speech which is of public concern and which is
substantially truthful should be conditionally afforded the same level of pro-
tection as was made available in Florida Star v. B.J.F,47 notwithstanding the
fact that the Court's later decision in Cohen suggests that the publication of
tortiously acquired information might not be entitled to such protection. The
Article urges that the rule of Florida Star, as well as that of Gertz and Sulli-
van, be modified to require, as a precondition to First Amendment protection
40 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (holding that an award of
punitive damages in a defamation suit involving matters of public concern must be accom-
panied by a showing of either knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth).
41 See infra Part HI.D.
42 See infra Part IV.
43 501 U.S. 663 (1991). See infra Part IV.A.
44 See infra Part IV.B.
45 See infra Part I.B.2.b.
46 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 820-24
(M.D.N.C. 1995). See infra Part IV.
47 491 U.S. 524 (1989). See infra Part IV.A.
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of tortious newsgathering, that the information reported be of significant
public concern. It further proposes that when the media intrudes into areas in
which individuals possess heightened expectations of personal privacy, such
as the home, the information obtained must be of the most serious public
concern in order to qualify for such protection.
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the arguments both for and against
protecting the media from liability under eithe, the common law or the First
Amendment. Part II compares newsgathering torts to constitutional defama-
tion law in order to show that, given the goals of the First Amendment, ex-
tending some degree of constitutional protection to the media from tort li-
ability would be justified. Part III describes the general principles of a
proposed rule of damage limitation, explained by broad analogy to the rule in
Gertz. It describes an approach often adopted at common law by which dam-
ages from publication are included in the calculation of damages for the un-
derlying newsgathering tort and discusses the possibility that juries might,
either subconsciously or willfully, adopt a similar approach. Part IV dis-
cusses the proposal to limit excessive damages for newsgathering torts in
light of current First Amendment doctrine. It then explains the limitations of
these doctrines and proposes modifications.
I. - DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT OR THE COMMON LAW SHIELD THE
MEDIA FROM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NEWSGATHERING TORTS?
A. The Majority Rule: No Privilege or Immunity
Any media claim to a First Amendment immunity from civil liability for
newsgathering torts is dubious given the substantial and weighty legal prece-
dent to the contrary. Although the Supreme Court has not yet squarely ad-
dressed the issue, it stated in dicta a quarter of a century ago that the First
Amendment "does not reach so far as to override the interest of the public in
ensuring that neither reporter nor source is invading the rights of other citi-
zens through reprehensible conduct forbidden to all other persons. "48
Subsequently, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 49 the Court held that a
newspaper could be liable under a theory of promissory estoppel when it
violated a pledge of anonymity in exchange for information, notwithstanding
the fact that the story the newspaper printed was both true and of public con-
cern.50 Noting that the media were subject to state tort and contract laws of
general applicability, 51 the Court reemphasized that the media "has no spe-
cial privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others."52 Lower court
48 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972).
49 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
50 See id. at 665.
51 See id. at 669-70.
52 Id. at 670 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)).
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precedents more closely on point with Food Lion also adhere to the general
rule that the First Amendment will not protect the media from liability for
crimes and torts committed during the newsgathering process. 53
In Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,54 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a judgment for
invasion of privacy and intrusion when reporters for Life magazine gained
admittance to the home of a "healer with clay, minerals and herbs" by means
of deception. The reporters took photographs and voice recordings that were
subsequently used in a story about the plaintiff, who was later arrested for
practicing medicine without a license. 55 The Dietemann court specifically
rejected Life magazine's First Amendment defense, stating that:
We agree that newsgathering is an integral part of news dissemination.
We strongly disagree, however, that the hidden mechanical contriv-
ances are "indispensable tools" of newsgathering .... The First
Amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity
from torts or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering.
The First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal or to intrude
by electronic means into the precincts ofanother's home or office. It
does not become such a license simply because the person subjected to
the intrusion is reasonably suspected of committing a crime. 56
53 See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that the First
Amendment does not afford the paparazzi any immunity from state tort law where the tor-
tious conduct was "unwarranted and unreasonable"). Some courts have recognized a lim-
ited media privilege against trespass claims where reporters enter a crime or accident
scene located on private property at the invitation or in the company of police or fire de-
partment authorities. Courts which recognize such a privilege do so on a theory of implied
consent from longstanding custom and usage. See, e.g., Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher,
340 So. 2d 914, 918-19 (Fla. 1976) (holding that, by virtue of longstanding custom, a
newspaper was not liable for trespass when its reporters entered private premises at the
invitation of police and fire department officials to view the scene of a fire). In a case de-
cided by a Florida District Court of Appeals only a few months prior to the decision of the
Florida Supreme Court in Fletcher, the court rejected a "custom and usage" defense to a
trespass claim where the media defendant had, at the invitation of the police, accompanied
officers onto private property as they executed a search warrant. See Green Valley Sch.,
Inc. v. Cowles Florida Broad., Inc., 327 So. 2d 810, 819 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976),
reh'g denied, 340 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 1976). The Florida Supreme Court, which had origi-
nally granted review in this case, later discharged the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. See id. Although the court did not explain its reason for discharging the writ, it is
clear that Green Valley presented no conflict with the court's holding in Fletcher because
there was no room for a finding of implied consent in Green Valley. See id.; cf. Anderson
v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding that a defense of implied con-
sent arising from custom or usage is not available to trespassing reporters); Prahl v. Bro-
samle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 780-81 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (distinguishing Fletcher).
54 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
55 See id. at 246.
56 Id. at 249 (footnote omitted).
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In the New York case of Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS,57 the defendant had di-
rected a reporter and camera crew to visit restaurants cited for health code
violations. Without seeking the plaintiff restaurant's permission, the crew
entered the premises at dinner hour with cameras rolling and lights shining.
The appeals court upheld an award of $1200 in compensatory damages but
ordered a retrial on an award of $250,000 in punitive damages.5 8 Although
both cases involved intrusions onto business premises, Le Mistral differed
from Food Lion because it involved a noisy and obstreperous intrusion by the
media for purposes of publicizing the results of a government investigation
rather than an undercover media investigation.
B. Arguments In Favor of Non-Liability: J.H. Desnick
The strongest and most frequently cited judicial support for a media privi-
lege or immunity from liability for minor newsgathering torts is the Seventh
Circuit decision in J.H. Desnick, M.D., Eye Services, Ltd. v. ABC,
59
authored by Judge Richard A. Posner. Both the common law tort and First
Amendment analyses in Desnick warrant special attention.
1. Desnick's Common Law Tort Analysis
The Desnick Eye Center, its owner, Dr. Desnick, and two surgeons em-
ployed by the center sued ABC for trespass, fraud, defamation, and violation
of state and federal wiretap statutes. 60 The suit arose out of a PrimeTime Live
broadcast suggesting that employees at the multi-state ophthalmology practice
recommended and performed unnecessary cataract surgery in order to gain
unjust enrichment. 61 The plaintiffs alleged that ABC's reporters gained ac-
cess to Desnick's Chicago clinic under false pretenses by assuring Dr.
Desnick that there would be no "ambush" interviews or undercover surveil-
lance and by promising that the program would be "fair and balanced."62
Meanwhile, ABC sent seven test patients armed with concealed cameras to
Desnick Test Centers in Wisconsin and Indiana. 63
Although the court would not dismiss the defamation count, 64 it disposed
of the plaintiffs' remaining four claims by construing them narrowly. 65 The
court dismissed the trespass claims on the grounds that there had been ex-
57 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1978).
58 The Appellate Division ordered a retrial of the issue of punitive damages because the
trial judge erroneously excluded testimony as to CBS's motive and purpose for entering
the restaurant. See id. at 817-18.
59 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
60 See id. at 1347, 1353.
61 See id. at 1348.
62 Id.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 1351.
65 See id. at 1351-55.
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press consent to the entry and that the question of whether consent was
fraudulently obtained was irrelevant to the viability of a common law action
for trespass. 66 The state privacy tort claims were dismissed because the
PrimeTime Live broadcast did not reveal any details concerning the lives of
the individual plaintiffs. 67 Nor was there any intrusion into "legitimately pri-
vate activities" such as private conversations: the only conversations re-
corded were conversations with the test patients themselves.68 The claims
based on alleged violations of federal and state wiretapping statutes were
dismissed because the federal statutes permit one party to a conversation to
record conversations except when the party's purpose in doing so is to com-
mit a crime or a tort.69 The Wisconsin statute additionally bars wiretapping
for the purpose of committing any other "injurious act." 70
The court concluded that ABC had not ordered the test patients into the
clinics for illegal purposes but only "to see whether the Center's physicians
would recommend cataract surgery on the testers."71 The court noted that
although the actual broadcast may have been defamatory, this was irrelevant
to the question of the defendant's liability under the wiretapping statutes be-
cause there was "no suggestion that the defendants sent the testers into the
[plaintiffs'] offices for the purpose of defaming the plaintiff ... "72 The
court dismissed the fraud claims as well because, despite the fact that ABC
gained access to Desnick's Chicago clinic by means of false promises, the
court found no "scheme to defraud," a prerequisite for recovery under the
state's "promissory fraud" law. 73 "An elaborate artifice of fraud is the cen-
tral meaning of a scheme to defraud through false promises. The only
scheme here was a scheme to expose publicly any bad practices that the in-
vestigative team discovered, and that is not a fraudulent scheme."74
The court concluded by stating that:
[I]f the broadcast itself does not contain actionable defamation, and no
established rights are invaded in the process of creating it (for the media
have no general immunity from tort or contract liability ... ), then the
target has no legal remedy even if the investigatory tactics used by the
network are surreptitious, confrontational, unscrupulous, and ungentle-
manly. 75
66 See id. at 1351.
67 See id. at 1353.
68 Id.
69 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1994).
70 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.31(2)(c) (West 1985).
71 Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353.
72 Id.
73 See id. at 1354-55.
74 Id. at 1355.
75 Id.
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Although the court explicitly affirmed that media have no general immu-
nity from tort or contract liability, the broad language used in the opinion
might be viewed as containing the seeds for a limited media "privilege" to
commit minor newsgathering torts free of liability. Referring to the fact that
the test patients entered offices that were open to anyone for professional
consultations, the court stated that "the entry was not invasive in the sense of
infringing the kind of interest of the plaintiffs that the law of trespass pro-
tects; it was not an interference with the ownership or possession of land. "76
The court distinguished Dietemann on the grounds that it had involved intru-
sion into a home as opposed to a business. 77 The court also distinguished Le
Mistral, where the court found that the reporters' activities were disruptive,
from the facts in Desnick.78 The court then drew a strong analogy to cases
upholding the legality of "testers" posing as prospective home buyers to gain
evidence of housing discrimination. 79
Nevertheless, Food Lion presents a more difficult case than Desnick for
reading the trespass tort small because Food Lion did not involve prospective
customers but prospective employees-employees who misrepresented them-
selves on their employment applications and otherwise betrayed their
"employer's" confidence in them. A property owner who holds property
open to customers might not be permitted to complain of trespass when
"customers" enter the premises for reasons at odds with the invitation, but a
property owner as employer may still have the right to insist upon a duty of
loyalty from its employees. Judge N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., the North Carolina
federal district court judge presiding over the Food Lion trial, held that the
case before him could be distinguished from Desnick on this ground. Deny-
ing ABC's motion for summary judgment,80 Judge Tilley emphasized that,
unlike Desnick, which involved media entry into areas to which anyone ex-
pressing a desire for ophthalmic services had access, Food Lion involved
granting the PrimeTime Live reporters access to areas from which the general
public was excluded. These reporters, Judge Tilley reasoned, were really the
employees of ABC, and a reasonable jury might find that their presence at
Food Lion was purely incidental to their jobs with PrimeTime Live.81
76 Id. at 1353.
77 See id. at 1352-53.
78 Id. at 1352.
79 See id. at 1353 (citing Northside Realty Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d
1348, 1355 (5th Cir. 1979)).
80 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1217, 1222-24
(M.D.N.C. 1996).
81 See id. Ultimately, the Food Lion jury found the ABC reporters liable not only for
fraud and trespass, but also for breach of the duty of loyalty they owed to Food Lion as
employees. Judge Tilley had earlier ruled that the courts of both North and South Carolina
would recognize such a cause of action and therefore denied defendants' motion to dis-
miss. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1217, 1228-30
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Thus, notwithstanding Desnick, the general strategy of allowing media de-
fendants to escape liability for newsgathering torts by reading traditional tort
actions small appears to have judicially imposed limitations. From a broader
jurisprudential standpoint, if courts read tort law ever more narrowly in
newsgathering tort cases while at the same time purporting to adhere to the
idea that the media remain subject to laws of general applicability, it may
create problems of credibility. To avoid such problems, judges must do more
than merely pay lip-service to the principle that the media "has no special
privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. "82
2. Desnick's First Amendment Analysis: Adhering to Gertz and Sullivan
In addition to intimating that any media privilege must be based on a re-
evaluation of the interests that lie at the heart of historic common law tort
actions, the Desnick court also suggested that claims seeking to hold media
defendants liable for newsgathering torts be viewed with skepticism. The
court recognized that such claims could serve as a means of circumventing
the constitutional safeguards that surround defamation law. 83
(M.D.N.C. 1996). A cause of action for breach of this duty of loyalty was first recognized
under North and South Carolina law by the court in Food Lion. See Food Lion, Inc. v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 959 n.2 (M.D.N.C. 1997). The jury found
that the reporters violated this duty by "failing to make a good faith effort toward per-
forming the job requirements of [their] employer Food Lion as a result of the time and at-
tention [they were] devoting to [their] investigation for ABC." and by "performing spe-
cific acts on behalf of ABC which proximately resulted in damage to Food Lion." Id.
Because the court found that state common law implied a duty of loyalty in the em-
ployer/employee relationship, this case sounded in both contract and tort. See generally
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 655 (5th ed.
1984) (defining the tort of breach of contract); 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 732 (noting
that states may modify substantive law to permit recovery in tort for breach of contract).
82 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (quoting Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)).
83 Under the rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the First Amendment limits the
ability of public figures to recover for defamation. See 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In order to
establish liability for defamation under Sullivan, public figures must prove "actual mal-
ice"-defined as "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth." Id. at 279-80.
They must do so with "convincing clarity." Id. at 285-86. Where defamatory speech re-
lates to matters of public concern, plaintiffs who are not public figures must still prove
"actual malice" in order to recover presumed or punitive damages. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). Non-Sullivan plaintiffs need only prove compen-
satory damages by whatever standard-apart from injury without fault-that the state may
set. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
(holding that plaintiffs need not allege "actual malice" in order to recover presumed or
punitive damages for defamatory speech addressing matters of purely private concern). All
defamation plaintiffs must prove falsity by a preponderance of the evidence if the speech in
question relates to matters of public concern. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986). "Substantial truth" is a defense. See Masson v. New Yorker
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When speech is constitutionally protected, the courts should also protect
the means of acquiring the content of that speech if such protection is neces-
sary to prevent plaintiffs from circumventing the First Amendment. Although
Judge Posner's remarks in Desnick might be viewed as dicta,84 they never-
theless strongly suggest that the First Amendment provides the media with at
least some protection from liability for newsgathering torts. 85
If Desnick is read to imply that the First Amendment's protection of
speech itself requires protection of the underlying newsgathering tort on an
"anti-circumvention" theory, it is important to ask what limiting principle
could be applied to render such an approach consistent with the statements in
Dietemann and Cohen that the media is not immune from liability for news-
gathering torts.86 Many lawsuits for newsgathering torts can be characterized
as an effort by the target of the media investigation to settle accounts for
damage to reputation, and many of these suits arise under circumstances in
which plaintiffs cannot recover for defamation. 87
If Desnick does imply that First Amendment "anti-circumvention" analysis
should come into play only when the alleged torts are deemed too trivial to
amount to a violation of "established rights," the "anti-circumvention" ar-
gument only serves to buttress the court's narrow reading of traditional
common law torts. However, such an interpretation fails to answer the ques-
tion of why Food Lion's rights as an employer should be entitled to more
weight than those at issue in Desnick when applying the general rule of
Dietemann and Cohen.
If the argument in Desnick is, in effect, that the speech should protect the
tort, a contrary argument might be made that the tort "taints" the ensuing
Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1991). In Desnick, the court argued that:
'Tabloid' style investigative television reportage ... is entitled to all the safeguards with
which the Supreme Court has surrounded liability for defamation. And it is entitled to
them regardless of the name of the tort ... and, we add, regardless of whether the tort
suit is aimed at the content of the broadcast or the production of the broadcast. (citations
omitted). J.H. Desnick, M.D., Eye Servs., Ltd. v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th
Cir. 1995).
84 Because the court ruled for defendants on common law grounds, it properly refrained
from deciding constitutional issues. See Champagne v. Schlesinger, 506 F.2d 979, 984
(7th Cir. 1974) (stating that federal courts should "avoid premature decisions of constitu-
tional questions"); see also Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U.S. 129,
136-37 (1946) ("If two questions are raised, one of non-constitutional and the other of
constitutional nature, and a decision of the non-constitutional question would make unnec-
essary a decision of the constitutional question, the former will be decided. This same rule
should guide the lower courts as well as this one." (footnote omitted)).
85 See also Cohen, 501 U.S. at 675-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that laws of
general applicability should not be "enforced to punish the expression of truthful informa-
tion or opinion").
86 See id. at 669; Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
87 See infra Part IV.
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speech, stripping it of First Amendment protection.88 Taken to its logical
conclusion, this counterargument requires that publication damages "refer
back" to the assessment of compensatory damages for the underlying tort.89
Given the statements in Dietemann and Cohen that acknowledge the states'
interest in neutral enforcement of tort and contract law, the media-protective
viewpoint impacts state interests too severely by seeking complete and com-
prehensive immunity for non-criminal newsgathering torts. On the other
hand, the target-protective viewpoint, by referring reputational damages back
to the underlying newsgathering torts, inflates compensatory damages and,
perhaps, punitive damages-thus chilling protected speech.
This Article proposes a compromise between these two positions. Recog-
nizing the states' legitimate interest in the neutral enforcement of their tort
laws, courts must nevertheless intervene on the basis of First Amendment
protections to prevent the award of excessive compensatory or punitive dam-
ages against media defendants. The following discussion makes a functional
and conceptual comparison of newsgathering torts and defamation law in or-
der to determine whether established constitutional protections of defamatory
speech9° might provide an analogy in support of affording constitutional
protection to newsgathering torts.
88 See infra Part IV.A.
89 See infra Part III.D. 1.
90 In cases where the Supreme Court construes the First Amendment as forestalling the
operation of state defamation laws, it frequently does so on behalf of media defendants.
Although in early First Amendment cases the Court did not specifically limit its holdings
to media defendants, it has done so in later cases. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986) ("[W]e hold that, at least where a newspaper pub-
lishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without
also showing that the statements at issue are also false."); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974) (noting that the holding "shields the press and broadcast media
from the rigors of strict liability for defamation"). The Court has intimated that non-media
defendants are similarly protected, and for a brief time, the Court seemed virtually unani-
mous in the view that media defendants should not be afforded more protection than non-
media defendants. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
773 (1985) (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he First Amendment gives no more protection to
the press in defamation suits than it does to others exercising their freedom of speech.");
see also id. at 783-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[A]t least six Members of this Court
agree today that, in the context of defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are
no greater and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations . . ").
Nevertheless, in more recent cases, the Court suggests that the question of whether media
and non-media defendants are equally privileged is an open one. See Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 n.6 (1990) (reserving judgment, in a defamation case, as to
whether the holding should apply equally to non-media defendants); Hepps, 475 U.S. at
779 n.4 (declining to address the question of whether the same standards apply to media
and non-media defendants). But see Underwager v. Salter, 22 F.3d 730, 734-35 (7th Cir.
1994) (rejecting the media/non-media distinction).
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF DEFAMATION AS A MODEL FOR
LIMITING NEWSGATHERING TORT LIABILITY
Courts have consistently reaffirmed the principle that the media are subject
to laws of general applicability to the same extent as members of the general
public. 91 It is therefore unlikely that courts will grant the media a general
immunity from civil liability for newsgathering torts. There are, neverthe-
less, strong arguments in favor of recognizing that the First Amendment lim-
its the extent to which the media may be held liable for punitive and exces-
sive compensatory damages.
This limited liability might take a variety of forms. At one extreme would
be complete immunity from all punitive damages: jury instructions could
specify that no punitive damages be awarded against the media defendant
even upon finding in favor of the plaintiff. A less expansive instruction might
provide that punitive damages would not be available unless the jury finds
that certain specified conditions have been met.92 Alternatively, courts could
grant a "partial" immunity-recognizing that the First Amendment requires
that punitive damage awards not be so large and burdensome as to deter the
media's investigatory role. 93 Another possible approach that courts might
consider, apart from the question of punitive damages, would be to recognize
an immunity from "excessive" compensatory damages.
The question of whether to accord the media immunity from excessive pu-
nitive or compensatory damages begs the question of whether media tort de-
fendants should receive preferential treatment under the First Amendment at
all. Although the Supreme Court has not given clear guidance on the issue of
whether the media are entitled to special First Amendment protections denied
to non-media tort defendants, 94 such an approach, at least as it relates to pu-
nitive damages, might be supported by precedent.
Supreme Court cases dealing with defamation indicate that the Court
might be prepared to accord the media some form of immunity from exces-
sive damage awards. The Court has historically looked askance at the award
of punitive damages against the media in defamation cases unless the publi-
cation is false and the plaintiff can prove that it was published with "actual
malice." Commentators who advocate the recognition of a First Amendment
privilege or immunity from newsgathering tort liability argue that constitu-
tional defamation law provides the appropriate analogy. 95
91 See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
92 For instance, the jury might be instructed that they may assess punitive damages
upon a finding of "actual malice."
93 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
94 See supra note 90.
95 See, e.g., Sandra S. Baron et al., Tortious Interference: The Limits of Common Law
Liability for Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS. J. 1027, 1062 (1996); Paul A.
LeBel, The Constitutional Interest in Getting the News: Toward a First Amendment Pro-
tection from Tort Liability for Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS.
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In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,96 the Supreme Court for the first time
ruled that the First Amendment imposes limits on state defamation law.97
The case arose after the New York Times printed an advertisement containing
minor inaccuracies and criticizing the response of Montgomery, Alabama
police to a civil rights demonstration. 98 The plaintiff, an elected commis-
sioner in charge of the police department, brought a defamation suit in state
court and was awarded $500,000 in damages after the jury was instructed
that the statements were "libelous per se" and that compensatory damages
could be "presumed. "99 The trial judge also instructed the jury that punitive
damages required proof of "malice" but declined to require the jury to dif-
ferentiate between punitive and compensatory damages in its verdict. l0 The
Supreme Court reversed, inaugurating the rule that public officials and public
figures'01 cannot prevail in defamation suits unless they prove "actual mal-
J. 1145, 1148-49 (1996).
96 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
97 See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1.01, at 1-3 (Release # 7, Jan.
1994) (noting that constitutional protection of defamatory speech began in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan).
98 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-59.
99 Id. at 262. Presumed damages are a form of relief sometimes available in defamation
actions in which the plaintiff is not required to prove that he or she has been injured. In-
stead, the existence of injury is presumed from the mere fact that the plaintiff was de-
famed. See SMOLLA, supra note 97, § 9.05, at 9-8 to 9-10 (Release # 6, Jan. 1993). Thus
far, courts have limited the doctrine of presumed damages to defamation claims. See, e.g.,
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262-64 (1978) (reversing an award of presumed damages
in the case of a student who alleged that he was denied due process by suspension from
school); Fellows v. National Enquirer, Inc., 721 P.2d 97, 109 (Cal. 1986) (noting that
California law does not permit an award of presumed damages for invasion of privacy).
Juries that employ a Dietemann-like approach by including publication damages when
awarding damages for newsgathering torts may be basing their decision on something
analogous to presumed damages. See infra notes 190-204 and accompanying text.
100 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 262.
101 See id. at 279-80 ("The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relat-
ing to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual mal-
ice ....'). Although some members of the Court have sought to differentiate between
public figures and public officials, such an approach has never commanded a majority. See
Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (plurality opinion) (stating that
"public figures"-as distinguished from "public officials"- need not meet the "actual
malice" requirement of Sullivan in order to recover for defamation but may recover "on a
showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers"); cf.
id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring) ("[D]ifferentiation between public figures and public
officials and adoption of separate standards of proof for each has no basis in law, logic, or
First Amendment policy."). Later cases make clear that Chief Justice Warren's views have
prevailed. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 & n.7 (noting that
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ice"-knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard for the truth' 02-by clear
and convincing evidence in order to prevail. 103
In a subsequent case, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 104 the Court held that
where the plaintiff is a private person but the alleged defamation relates to "a
matter of public concern," the plaintiff must prove "actual malice" in order
to recover punitive or presumed damages. 0 5 The Court has made clear that
defamation plaintiffs subject to the rules of Sullivan or Gertz bear the burden
of proving falsity when they are confronted with an affirmative defense of
truth. 106 In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. ,107 the Court
further clarified Gertz by holding that its rule did not apply in cases involv-
ing defamatory speech about private persons that is not of public concern. 108
. Although tortious newsgathering may result in the publication of material
that is alleged to be defamatory, defamation and similar tort claims are rarely
founded on acts commited in the newsgathering process because the tort of
defamation redresses injury of an altogether different nature. Some readers
may not find the analogy between defamation and newsgathering torts en-
tirely persuasive. The next Part of the Article therefore examines an alterna-
tive basis for constitutional protection of newsgathering torts-the chilling
effects of media liability. 109
Warren commanded a majority on this point). The Court has recognized that private indi-
viduals may become public figures if they "voluntarily inject [themselves] or [are] drawn
into a particular public controversy . . . ." Id. at 351.
102 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
103 See id. at 285-86.
104 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
105 See id. at 348-49 (holding that, absent a showing of "actual malice," the First
Amendment prohibits imposing of damages that go beyond "actual injury"). Gertz leaves
open the question of what types of injury may be compensated under state law but requires
that any claim of damages be supported by competent evidence. See id.; see also BRUCE
W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 9.2.1, at 434 (2d ed. 1994 Supp.) (discussing the
"actual injury" requirement of Gertz).
106 See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986).
107 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
108 See id. at 761 ("In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no
matters of public concern, we hold that state interest adequately supports awards of pre-
sumed and punitive damages-even absent a showing of 'actual malice.'").
109 The Court has implicitly recognized the dangers post by state laws to First Amend-
ment principles. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that
the publisher of lawfully obtained, truthful information cannot be subjected to liability un-
der state tort law except where the law is "narrowly tailored to a state interest of the high-
est order"); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that the First
Amendment limits the ability of public officials to bring intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding
that the First Amendment permits, but does not require, states to privilege the press in
misappropriation of publicity case); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)
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A. The Chilling Effect of Large Civil Damage Awards on Valuable Speech
In defamation and related tort claims where the Court has delineated First
Amendment limitations on damages, the injury arises directly from publica-
tion. 110 In newsgathering tort cases, however, the injury occurs as a result of
actions taken by the media in the investigatory process prior to publication.
Some may therefore argue that because such acts are at a further remove
from the speech itself, the chilling effect of punitive or excessive compensa-
tory damages on free speech is more attenuated. Under this analysis, news-
gathering torts should merit less protection than harms caused by the speech
itself.
This distinction may be more conceptual than real, however. The threat of
punitive or excessive compensatory damages for newsgathering torts neces-
sarily chills the newsgathering process and, therefore, the ensuing speech."'
Furthermore, just as the investigation is necessary to the speech, the torts
may be necessary to the investigation. In Food Lion, if ABC's investigative
reporters had not committed fraud on their applications, they would not have
gained admittance to Food Lion's inner premises. If these reporters had been
prevented from recording their observations with hidden cameras, the public
would not have learned of the health threat posed by the unsanitary condi-
tions discovered. 112
Although an argument can be made that ABC could have dealt with a per-
ceived threat to public health by alerting the North Carolina Commissioner
of Agriculture of its suspicions,113 it is still clear that a compelling public in-
terest is served by permitting the media to conduct investigatory reporting
using the methods in controversy in Food Lion. The media have the ability to
alert the public to health problems with a speed that government authorities
would probably not be able to match. 114 Moreover, the use of media re-
(holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit imposing liability on the press
for publishing truthful information contained in official court records); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967) (holding that a state-law tort claim for false light invasion of privacy
must be supported by evidence of actual malice).
1o See, e.g., J.H. Desnick, M.D., Eye Servs., Ltd. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 44
F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiffs stated a claim of defamation but
dismissing claims of trespass, invasion of privacy, fraud, and illegal wiretapping).
II See LeBel, supra note 95, at 1147 (arguing that "a legal link should be forged to
correspond to the logical link between the acquisition and dissemination of information").
112 See Singer, supra note 5, at 65 (noting that testing food samples for the presence of
harmful bacteria is a much less effective way of uncovering unsanitary food handling
practices than direct observation of those practices: "You can't just go in and buy some
food samples. Observation of practice is absolutely essential." (quoting Kathryn Boor,
Professor of Food Microbiology, Department of Food Science, Cornell University)).
113 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-140. The North Carolina statute authorizes the Com-
missioner of Agriculture to conduct examinations and investigations concerning food safety
and to suspend food handling permits when violations are found. See id.
114 See LeBel, supra note 95, at 1147 ("[T]he press serves a number of public interest
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sources to supplement the government's monitoring role saves both the gov-
ernment and taxpayers considerable amounts of money. Finally, because it is
often the government itself that is the target of investigatory journalism,
merely reporting violations to the responsible agency may not always be ef-
fective. 1 15
B. The Availability of Extrajudicial Remedies
Another perceived difference between the law of defamation and that of
newsgathering torts relates to the Court's assumptions about plaintiffs' access
to extrajudicial alternatives to redress their injuries and mitigate their dam-
ages.t16The erection of constitutional barriers to defamation actions is to
some degree premised on the assumption that defamation plaintiffs have ac-
cess to the media and thus have the opportunity to rebut allegedly defamatory
statements. 117 Although this presumption of media access is specific to Sulli-
van-type public figure plaintiffs, the private figure/public controversy plain-
tiffs to whom the Court turned its attention in Gertz also frequently have the
opportunity to redress their injuries through media rebuttal.118 The underly-
functions in the dissemination of information that the press alone has the resources, the
interest and the ability to acquire.").
115 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
(vacating stays on the publication of the "Pentagon Papers").
116 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) ("The first remedy of
any victim of defamation is self-help-using available opportunities to contradict the lie or
correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation.").
117 See id. ("Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater ac-
cess to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportu-
nity to counteract false statements than private individuals might enjoy."). This distinction
was one reason the Gertz Court subjected private figure/public controversy plaintiffs to a
less stringent constitutional standard than public figures and officials under Sullivan's ac-
tual malice requirement. See id. at 344-46; see also Dameron v. Washington Magazine,
Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 741 (1986) (noting that an individual may involuntarily become a
"limited-purpose public figure"); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d
1287, 1293-98 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing the factors that a court must consider in de-
termining whether an individual is a "limited-purpose public figure").
118 On rare occasions, purely private defamation plaintiffs may enjoy significant media
access to rebut allegedly defamatory statements. See Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
37 F.3d 1541 (4th Cir. 1994). Foretich involved a defamation action against producers and
broadcasters of a television docudrama in which it was stated that the plaintiffs had sexu-
ally abused their granddaughter, an accusation that emerged during the course of a highly
publicized custody dispute. See id. at 1543. The plaintiffs were quoted in eleven newspa-
per and magazine articles, appeared on both the Phil Donahue Show and a British televi-
sion documentary dealing with the custody dispute, and gave a 30-minute interview that
served as the basis of a full-length book about the case. See id. at 1545-49. Despite this
wide access to the media, the court found that the vast majority of the plaintiffs' statements
were made as a reasonable self-defense response to the abuse charges rather than as an at-
tempt to influence the outcome of the custody dispute. See id. at 1564. Thus, the plaintiffs
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ing assumption of both Sullivan and Gertz is that, while media rebuttal alone
will seldom suffice to undo defamatory harm, rebuttal speech can to some
degree counteract the injurious effects of defamatory speech, both to the
benefit of the individual's reputation and society's interest in knowing the
truth.'1 9 By comparison, the injuries typically caused by newsgathering torts
could not normally be redressed even in part by opportunity for rebuttal.
Therefore, plaintiffs in cases of newsgathering torts presumably would re-
quire full compensation via legal damages to be made whole again.
C. The Media Defendant's Mens Rea
Another significant difference between defamation and newsgathering torts
is the defendant's state of mind in committing the tort. Defamation can be
committed either intentionally or by inadvertence. The Court's introduction
of an actual malice requirement in defamation claims raises the degree of
culpability required to state a successful claim under state law. Under this
rule, plaintiffs who fall into one of the categories delineated in Sullivan,
Gertz, and their progeny must prove a mens rea similar to that required to
establish an intentional tort. Rather than permitting states to set their own
intent standard at negligence, gross negligence, or strict liability, the Court
requires plaintiffs to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that publica-
tion was made either with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard of
the truth. 120 Newsgathering torts, by comparison, are usually committed in-
tentionally during the course of an investigation. Despite this fact, media de-
fendants can make a solid argument that they committed these torts for an
important and overriding public purpose. This argument provides the basis
for constitutional protection of the media from liability for punitive or
"excessive" compensatory damages.
D. The Value of the Protected Speech
To avoid the chilling effect that potential defamation liability may have on
valuable First Amendment speech, the Sullivan and Gertz Courts devised
could not be deemed public figures and Sullivan's actual malice standard did not apply.
See id.
119 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9 ("An opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to
undo harm of defamatory falsehood .... But the fact that the self-help remedy of rebut-
tal, standing alone, is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrelevant to our in-
quiry."); see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 304-05 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting that the
Court's holding "does not leave the public official without defenses against unsubstantiated
opinions or deliberate misstatements"). The Court continued: "'Under our system of gov-
ernment, counterargument and education are the weapons available to expose these mat-
ters . . . .' The public official certainly has equal if not greater access than most private
citizens to media of communication." (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389
(1962)).
120 See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
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rules to protect the media from such liability. This protection applies equally
to speech that is true and speech that is false-speech which, in and of itself,
might be deemed socially worthless, if not harmful and dangerous. 121
In contrast, newsgathering torts typically yield speech that is both substan-
tially truthful and of considerable social value. 22 Although the targets of un-
dercover media investigations have great incentive to allege that the ensuing
publications are false and defamatory, newsgathering tort cases in which
such allegations are well-founded are more likely to be the exception rather
than the rule. Under constitutional analysis in defamation cases, the media
need not go to great lengths to verify information prior to publishing in order
to qualify for protection. 123 Where the actual malice standard of Sullivan and
Gertz applies, "reckless disregard" means that, from the media defendant's
perspective, ignorance is often bliss and wisdom folly. By comparison, re-
porters are more likely to commit newsgathering torts when they are in hot
pursuit of "the truth" and anxious to bring an important matter to the pub-
lic's attention. 12
4
Sullivan and Gertz hold that, under certain circumstances, the First
Amendment protects "bad speech" from liability in state law-based defama-
tion suits so that "good speech" will not be chilled. This begs the question-
why shouldn't the Court also afford the media protection for the relatively
121 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) ("False statements
of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the mar-
ketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual's reputation that cannot easily be
repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective.").
122 See e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (refusing to hold pub-
lisher liable for printing documents relevant to accusations that the U.S. Senator had been
corrupted by foreign lobbyists, even though the documents had been obtained by intrusion
into the Senator's office files); Note, Intrusion and the Investigative Reporter, 71 TEx. L.
REV. 433, 433-34 (1992) (discussing 20/20 broadcast obtained by subterfuge that exposed
inhuman treatment of nursing home patients and resulted in state investigations); Marcel
Dufresne, To Sting or Not to Sting, COL. JOURN. REV., May/June 1991, at 49-51
(detailing undercover investigation by suburban newspaper to document racial discrimina-
tion in real estate industry); Zay N. Smith & Pamela Zekman, The Mirage Takes Shape,
COL. JOURN. REV., Sept./Oct. 1979, at 51-57 (describing Chicago newspaper's under-
cover establishment of public tavern in order to expose government corruption in licensing
and inspection). See also MITCHELL V. CHARNLEY, REPORTING 337-48 (3d ed. 1975);
LEONARD DOWNIE, JR., THE NEW MUCKRAKERS 121-88 (1976).
123 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 ("The First Amendment requires that we protect some
falsehood in order to protect speech that matters."); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 731 (1968) (holding that the failure to investigate was not, by itself, sufficient to
demonstrate "reckless disregard" under Sullivan's actual malice standard).
124 It is worth noting that defamatory statements are still given protection under Gertz
and Sullivan, even when they are published solely for the purpose of increasing profits.
See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989)
(noting that the statements at issue in Sullivan were part of a paid advertisement).
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minor "bad acts" that are sometimes necessary to produce "good speech?"
Such an approach is in accord with accepted doctrine granting speech that is
both substantially truthful and of public concern a very high level of common
law and constitutional protection. 125
Many of the reasons for applying constitutional law to defamation claims
have equal force in support of the extension of similar protection to news-
gathering torts. Although providing the media with complete immunity
would not be advisable, limits on the damages that the states can impose are
essential to ensuring the health of the newsgathering process. Investigatory
journalism serves an invaluable purpose in our society, and the information it
uncovers serves the public interest in ways that defamatory statements can-
not. The next Part of this Article proposes methods for limiting the media's
liability for newsgathering torts.
III. A PROPOSAL TO LIMIT EXCESSIVE DAMAGES UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. Limiting Damages by Analogy to Gertz Rather Than Sullivan
The conditional First Amendment immunity that I propose as a means of
eliminating excessive media liability for newsgathering torts has three princi-
pal goals: (1) exclusion of reputational damages when assessing compensa-
tory damages; (2) limitation of compensatory damages for newsgathering
torts to "actual damages" proven by competent evidence; and (3) a general
prohibition against punitive damage awards. Courts would be permitted to
make such damage relief available only if specific conditions are met.
The parallels between newsgathering torts and Gertz-type defamation cases
125 See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536 (1989) (refusing to allow a
state to impose liability on a newspaper that published "'lawfully obtained truthful infor-
mation about a matter of public significance"' (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co.,
443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979))); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,
839 (1978) (holding that the First Amendment precludes imposing liability for harms
caused by the publication of information relating to a state's official inquiry into judicial
conduct because the public interest is served by such publication); Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v.
District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment does not
permit a state to prohibit publication of information obtained in court proceedings that
were open to the general public); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975)
("[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press to liability for
truthfully publishing information released to the public in official court records."); Haynes
v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1227 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying the Illinois com-
mon law rule that substantial truth is a complete defense to defamation); Virgil v. Time,
Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) (explaining that speech which is "of legitimate
concern to the public" is protected by the First Amendment); see also KEETON ET AL., su-
pra note 81, § 652D (summarizing the rule that one can only be subject to liability for in-
vasion of privacy via publication if the matter publicized is not of legitimate concern to the
public).
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support the proposed immunity being proposed, notwithstanding the Food
Lion court's rejection of such an argument. 126 First, unlike a Sullivan plain-
tiff, the Gertz plaintiff's inability to prove actual malice will not necessarily
free the defendant from liability. A lack of actual malice only relieves the
Gertz defendant from liability for the punitive and presumed damages 27 that
often account for high awards in defamation cases. 128 Second, the defining
characteristic of cases falling under Gertz is also present in newsgathering
tort cases: the allegedly defamatory speech relates to a matter of public con-
cern. 
129
Media defendants may argue that when their speech is both truthful and of
public concern, they should be entitled to complete First Amendment immu-
nity from liability for newsgathering torts. The media would posit that, be-
cause speech which is both false and defamatory is of less social value than
the speech generally produced via tortious newsgathering techniques, the
analogy to Sullivan is stronger than the analogy to Gertz.130 Certainly, a sig-
nificant number of plaintiffs suing for damages for newsgathering torts
committed in the course of undercover journalism-including, arguably,
Food Lion itself-could be classified as public figures within the meaning of
Sullivan.
Nevertheless, a First Amendment rule of damage limitation drawn by
analogy to Gertz would balance the states' strong interest in the neutral en-
forcement of their tort laws against the media's interest in investigatory jour-
nalism, as well as protecting the public's right to receive information on
matters of public concern. A broader rule of immunity modeled on Sullivan,
by comparison, would serve the First Amendment interests of the media and
the public but would undermine the states' interest in the neutral enforcement
of their laws. As such, it is doubtful that a rule based on an analogy to Sulli-
van comports with the Court's concern in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.131
about allowing states to enforce generally applicable laws.
B. The Scope of the Limited Immunity Confined to Non-Criminal
Newsgathering Torts
Torts that reporters typically commit during newsgathering activities in-
clude: (1) fraud or misrepresentation, usually centering on the reporter's ema-
126 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 931-32
(M.D.N.C. 1997) (finding that Gertz could not support ABC's argument that the First
Amendment provides immunity from punitive damages for newsgathering torts).
127 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
128 See infra note 208.
129 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
130 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
131 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) ("[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its
ability to gather and report the news.").
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ployment status or affiliation; 132 (2) trespass on the property of the target of
the investigation;1 33 (3) intrusion into the privacy or seclusion of the target's
home, 134 often by means of subterfuge; (4) violation of privacy by hidden
camera surveillance; 135 and (5) tortious interference with contract in order to
obtain information from third parties. ' 36
132 See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc, v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 822
(M.D.N.C. 1995) (declining to dismiss fraud claim); see also LeBel, supra note 95, at
1156-58 (arguing that the needs of plaintiffs claiming harm because of reporter misrepre-
sentation of identity must be balanced against the First Amendment value of the informa-
tion sought).
133 See, e.g., Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 227 (Sup. Ct. 1981)
(declining to allow immunity for reporters in a trespass claim); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295
N.W.2d 768, 778 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (holding reporter liable for trespass); see also
LeBel, supra note 95, at 1158-59 (arguing that, in some circumstances, First Amendment
interests outweigh state interests in providing a remedy for trespass).
134 See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971) (affirming
an award for invasion of privacy); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B
(1977) (discussing the tort of intrusion upon seclusion).
135 See, e.g., J.H. Desnick, M.D., Eye Services, Ltd. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 44
F.3d 1345, 1353-54 (7th Cir. 1995) (declining to hold reporters liable under state or fed-
eral wiretapping statutes); Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 824 (dismissing wiretapping
claims); see also Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), re-
view granted, 938 P.2d 1, 1 (Cal. 1997) (declining to recognize a cause of action for inva-
sion of privacy by photography as a "subtort of invasion of privacy"); LeBel, supra note
95, at 1160 ("The additional credibility associated with the images and sounds that are re-
corded in an encounter [that is surreptitiously recorded] contributes to the public informa-
tion about the matter in question in a more meaningful and dramatic way than an account
of the encounter that is unsupported by film or tape.").
136 Recently, after a great deal of internal wrangling between producers of the CBS
news program 60 Minutes and network attorneys and executives, CBS decided not to air an
interview with Jeffrey Wigand, a whistleblowing tobacco company executive. See Howard
Kurtz, '60 Minutes' Kills Piece on Tobacco Industry, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1995, at A3.
CBS attorneys advised the network that if the segment aired, the network could be sued for
tortious interference with contract for inducing Mr. Wigand to breach a confidentiality
agreement between him and his former employer, the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Cor-
poration. See id. Although Brown & Williamson did sue Mr. Wigand, no suit was ever
filed against CBS. See Bill Carter, Tobacco Company Sues Former Executive over CBS
Interview, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at A14. Eventually, after the Wall Street Journal
published Mr. Wigand's deposition testimony in the suit between him and Brown & Wil-
liamson, CBS aired the interview. See Bill Carter, CBS Broadcasts Tobacco Executive's
Interview, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at B8. It is, however, not clear whether CBS's at-
torneys' original fears were well-grounded. See James C. Goodale, '60 Minutes' v. CBS
and Vice Versa, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 1995, at 3 ("Apparently, there is no reported case
where this claim, by itself, has ever been made against a news organization for publica-
tion."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977) (discussing the tort of
intentional interference with contract); Baron, supra note 95, at 1067 ("[W]hen protected
interests are burdened significantly ... the tort can withstand constitutional scrutiny only
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The proposed First Amendment immunity from liability for excessive
damages is solely envisioned to cover non-criminal torts. States can assert an
even stronger interest in the neutral enforcement of their criminal law than
they can assert with respect to their tort law. 137 When state legislatures clas-
sify certain acts as criminal rather than tortious, they are, to some degree,
reflecting the public's sense that such activity is reprehensible. 138 Although
there is not a great deal of unanimity among the states as to whether a par-
ticular activity is criminal, states generally do not treat newsgathering torts as
crimes. 139
Where particular newsgathering acts that give rise to tort claims are also
criminal acts, no First Amendment immunity should be made available.
States must also be accorded considerable leeway in defining what is or is
if its adverse impact is justified by some subordinating, valid, governmental interest 'of
the highest order.' A tortious interference claim based on newsgathering activity seems
unlikely to meet this test."); LeBel, supra note 95, at 1160-62 (arguing that media liability
for tortious interference with contract should be resolved by a First Amendment balancing
analysis). See David A. Anderson, Torts, Speech, and Contracts, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1499,
1513-37 (1997) (raising the possibility that state tort actions for inducement to contract
breach by truthful persuasion might be held presumptively violative of First Amendment
commercial speech doctrine; but suggesting that, because the application of such doctrine
by the Supreme Court in any specific truthful persuasion case would rely on ad hoc bal-
ancing that would be both unpredictable and ill-suited to evaluation of tort liability, the
better solution would be for state courts to adopt a tort rule, modeled on Restatement sec-
tion 772, that inducement by truthful persuasion, without more, is not improper and not
actionable); Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, (1998) (recommending that courts deny enforcement to confi-
dentiality agreements "when there exists an overriding public interest in the suppressed
speech," at 266; and, while questioning whether such agreements constitute the state ac-
tion necessary to implicate the First Amendment, at 347-53, suggesting that a similar con-
stitutional balancing test might be applied, at 360-61).
137 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (holding that the press
is subject to generally applicable state promissory estoppel law); Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that free exercise of religion is subject to com-
pliance with a state criminal law of general applicability proscribing the use of controlled
substances).
138 See Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76
B.U. L. REV. 201, 206 (1996) (noting that "[ciriminal liability signals moral condemna-
tion of the offender, while civil liability does not").
139 But see generally, 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass §§ 162-199 (1991 & Supp. 1998)
(discussing criminal liability for trespass); 37 C.J.S. Fraud §§ 96-105 (1997 & Supp.
1998) (discussing criminal fraud). See also Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
984 F. Supp. 923, 936 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (considering ABC's motion for remittitur and
deciding that "the legislative judgment that actions not entirely remote from the actions
here be punishable by imprisonment weighs in favor of allowing much of the monetary
sanction to stand").
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not criminal activity. 140 For instance, states should be permitted to impose
criminal sanctions for a variety of acts, including: gaining access to the tar-
get's office or home by breaking and entering 41 or impersonating a govern-
ment official;142 obtaining incriminating information by stealing the target's
documents;143 and wiretapping a phone conversation to which the investiga-
tors are not a party. 144 Nevertheless, for purposes of the proposed immunity,
newsgathering torts should not be deemed criminal on the basis of strained or
hyper-technical constructions of broadly worded criminal statutes such as the
Federal Mail Fraud Act' 45 or RICO 146 under circumstances where it is un-
likely that criminal charges would have been brought.
C. Minimum Prerequisites to First Amendment Relief
1. "Non-Publication" or "Pre-Publication" Conditions
If the courts recognize a First Amendment immunity from punitive and
excessive compensatory damages for newsgathering torts, such immunity
140 See Robert M. O'Neil, Tainted Sources: First Amendment Rights and Journalistic
Wrongs, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS J. 1005, 1013 (1996) (noting that states retain sub-
stantial latitude in defining what is unlawful).
141 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669 ("The press may not with impunity break and enter an
office or dwelling to gather news.").
142 See State v. Cantor, 534 A.2d 83, 87 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (affirming
the conviction of a reporter who had falsely represented to the mother of a homicide vic-
tim that she was "from the morgue"). The charge in this case was impersonating a public
official. See id.
143 But see Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (declining to hold
newspaper columnists liable for invasion of privacy or intrusion where documents were
copied by the target's employees and turned over to defendants who published the infor-
mation knowing how the documents had been acquired).
144 See, e.g., J.H. Desnick, M.D., Eye Services, Ltd. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 44
F.3d 1345, 1353-54 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that defendants did not violate either federal
or state wiretapping statutes by surreptitiously recording a conversation to which they were
party because their purpose in doing so was not to commit a crime or tort); Russell v.
ABC, Inc., 23 MED. L. REP. 2428, 2429-30 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (declining to hold reporter
liable under either state of federal wiretapping statutes where reporter secretly recorded
his conversations with plaintiff).
145 18 U.S.C. §§ 1342-1343 (1994). Section 1341 forbids using the federal mails for "a
scheme or artifice to defraud;" or for "obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses." Id. § 1341. Section 1343 covers fraud by "wire, radio or televi-
sion." Id. § 1343.
146 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations). The definition of covered acts in § 1961 includes the
mail fraud provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1343. See also Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 817-20 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (dismissing plaintiff's civil
RICO claim derived from the mail and wire fraud statute).
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should be conditional. As a threshold, the media defendant should be re-
quired to show that the newsgathering tort was necessary to the investigation.
Such a threshold would help to ensure that the proposed immunity is granted
only in cases where large awards would, in fact, chill important and neces-
sary newsgathering acts.
A second requirement should be that the investigation relate to a matter
that the media defendant reasonably believed would lead to speech about a
matter of "significant public concern." This requirement correlates with the
rule adopted by the Court in Dun & Bradstreet allowing private defamation
plaintiffs to recover presumed or punitive damages even when they are un-
able to prove actual malice unless the allegedly defamatory speech relates to
"matters of public concern."147 However, the requirement that the informa-
tion relate to a matter of "significant public concern" is intended to be a
stricter standard than the "of public concern" standard in Florida Star'48 and,
arguably, implicit in Sullivan.149
The third condition that would need to be satisfied before granting immu-
nity for newsgathering torts is that the tortious conduct, even if not criminal,
is not unusually egregious in nature. Although virtually all newsgathering
torts are intentional torts, some jurisdictions may find the newsgatherer's
conduct sufficiently willful as to permit the factfmder to impute common law
malice-thus justifying an award of punitive damages. 150 The common law
malice requirement should, however, be construed narrowly to require out-
rageous, egregious, or aggravated behavior rather than merely intentional
behavior. This condition is intended to limit punitive damage awards to ex-
treme and unusual cases.
A final factor to consider would be whether the media defendants created
or, as alleged in Food Lion, significantly contributed to, the conditions they
were reporting. The trial judge in Food Lion found that none of the report-
ers' acts could account for Food Lion's publication damages and held that
the jury could not consider the alleged "staging" incidents as a basis for as-
sessing publication damages. 151 This holding suggests that the ABC reporters
147 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985).
148 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539 (1989).
149 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1990) (noting
that, in cases like Sullivan, which center on the significance of the speech involved, "the
overtly political nature of the individuals' activities and of the government's punitive re-
sponse played a catalytic role in the Court's abrogation of this historic blind spot in First
Amendment doctrine").
150 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 81, § 2, at 9-10 (discussing the common law re-
quirements for an award of punitive damages); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 935 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (considering the reprehensibility prong of
BMW and noting that "[tihis case involved deliberate false statements [made] ... for the
sole purpose of deceiving Food Lion").
151 See Food Lion, Inc., v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 966
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did not significantly contribute to the conditions that they were investigating.
Publication should not be made a prerequisite to the grant of any First
Amendment-based immunity. Not infrequently, media defendants commence
an undercover investigation but ultimately decide not to publish the informa-
tion they obtain. This occurs in a variety of situations, including those in
which the investigation reveals that the allegations are false, or the under-
cover reporters "blow their cover" before they have obtained the proof that
would support their publication.
If there has been no publication and none is contemplated, then the media
defendants should have to plead all four of the "non-publication conditions"
in their defense. The defendants should bear the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the first three conditions. However, the
plaintiff should bear the burden of proving that the undercover reporters sig-
nificantly contributed to creating the problems they reported.1 52 Additional
considerations that should be taken into account in assessing the propriety of
damage awards where the challenged conduct leads to publication are dis-
cussed in the next Part.
2. "Post-Publication" Conditions
In addition to the four "pre-publication" conditions outlined above, three
additional "publication conditions" should apply both when the newsgather-
ing tort has already resulted in publication and when publication is imminent.
Courts should consider whether (1) the investigation in fact led to publication
and the investigation was necessary to that publication; (2) the media speech
did in fact relate to "a matter of significant public concern;"153 and (3) the
speech was substantially truthful. The burden of proving falsity should rest
with the plaintiff. 54
If all three of these additional "publication conditions" obtain, then higher
First Amendment interests are implicated than in cases where there was no
publication or where the publication was false or misleading. If reporters find
it necessary to commit torts in their pursuit of "the truth," there is a signifi-
canit First Amendment interest to be served by not deterring them from pub-
lishing because of their fear of liability for punitive or excessive compensa-
tory damage awards.
The media defendant should have to plead all three of the "publication"
conditions, and again, with the exception of truthfulness, should bear the
(M.D.N.C. 1997).
152 See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986) (placing the
burden of proving falsity on private figure plaintiffs in cases where the alleged defamation
relates to a matter of public concern).
153 This condition differs from the second of the "prepublication conditions" in that it
requires more than a good faith belief that the investigation will result "in speech of signifi-
cant public concern. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
154 See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 778.
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burden of proof as to each.155 By analogy to the Hepps156 rule involving
Gertz- and Sullivan-type plaintiffs, the burden of proof should be shifted to
the plaintiff on this point. Furthermore, the difficulty of separating, in the
minds of jurors, newsgathering damages from publication damages suggests
that it would be advisable to try the media defendant's content-based defense
that the publication was substantially true and of significant public concern to
the judge rather than to the jury.
The interests protected by the First Amendment are far better served by
the publication of truthful information of public concern than by the publica-
tion of false and defamatory information. If the plaintiff can prove that the
tort-predicated publication is not substantially true, then the media defendant
should be denied any First Amendment immunity from punitive damages
and, as will be discussed in greater detail, must rely on his due process rights
under BMW to scale back excessive punitive damages. 157
3. "Of the Most Serious Public Concern:" Intrusions into Zones of
Personal Privacy and Autonomy
When media defendants intrude into zones of personal privacy and auton-
omy, First Amendment protection from excessive punitive or compensatory
damages should be further conditioned on whether the matters investigated or
published were "of the most serious public concern." Such matters would
include felonies, corruption of public officials, dangers to our democratic in-
stitutions, and activities that imperil the public health and safety. In cases in-
volving relatively minor, non-criminal torts that result in instrusion into
zones of personal privacy and autonomy such as private homes or apart-
ments, satisfying any lesser standard should not suffice to forestall the neu-
tral application of state tort law.
The common law recognizes a greater expectation of privacy and confi-
dentiality in some situations than in others. The tort of "intrusion upon seclu-
sion" involves intrusion, physical or otherwise, "upon the solitude or seclu-
sion of another." 15 8 To state a claim of intrusion, an individual must have
both a subjective expectation of privacy as well as an objectively reasonable
155 Cf. James E. King &. Frederick T. Muto, Compensatory Damages for Newsgather-
ing Torts: Toward a Workable Standard, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 919, 949 (1981)
(suggesting that the media defendant bear the burden of rebutting the presumption that any
matter which is unearthed through an intrusion or trespass is not of 'public interest"'). The
author concludes that, except where the Supreme Court has held otherwise, the media
should bear the burden of proof on the critical elements of the defense because the they are
invoking a constitutional defense.
156 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986) (placing the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff).
157 See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996); see also infra,
Part IV.D (discussing BMW).
158 RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
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expectation of privacy. 159 Under state law, individuals have reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy in areas such as a private residences, private oices,1
private bedrooms in hotels and hospitals, 161 and public restrooms. 162 In the
workplace, courts have also found a reasonable expectation of privacy in
such places as private changing areas, 163 closed offices in which employees
receive confidential performance evaluations,' 64 and personal file cabinets
and desk drawers. 165 Open work areas are not among the areas protected by
the tort of intrusion. However, the tort provides a remedy for more than just
intrusions into physical space, 166 including opening another's mail, examin-
ing someone's wallet, or inspecting private documents such as bank rec-
ords. 167
In any case, defendants who gain access to non-public areas by commit-
ting a tort will not be liable for intrusion unless the plaintiff "had an actual
expectation of seclusion or solitude and that expectation was objectively rea-
sonable."168 In Desnick, the Seventh Circuit correctly held that the tort of
intrusion did not apply to reporters who entered a clinic that held itself open
to the public. The court distinguished the facts before it from those in Diete-
mann, in which an intrusion into a private home met the criterion of violating
159 See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434, 446-47 (Ct.
App. 1996), review granted, 934 P.2d 1278 (Cal. 1997).
160 See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) ("[O]ne who in-
vites another to his home or office ... does not and should not be required to take the risk
that what is heard and seen will be transmitted by photograph or recording . . . ."); Miller
v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a camera crew's intrusion
into a private bedroom was the sort of "highly offensive" conduct proscribed by the tort of
intrusion).
161 See Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 794 (Me. 1976) (recognizing, for
the first time under Maine law, an action for invasion of privacy where a physician photo-
graphed a patient lying in a hospital bed against the patient's wishes).
162 See Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
plaintiff stated a claim for intrusion where defendant had installed a viewing device in a
women's restroom).
163 See Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d 1422, 1427 (8th Cir. 1991)
(holding that fashion models surreptitiously videotaped in their dressing area by security
guards stated a claim of invasion of privacy under Missouri law).
164 See Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595, 598 (1997), review granted, 938
P.2d 1, 1 (Cal. 1997).
165 See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
166 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
167 See id.
168 People For The Ethical Treatment Of Animals v. Bobby Bersoni, Ltd., 895 P.2d
1279, 1279-80 (Nev. 1995) ("It is of no relevance to the intrusion tort that [defendant]
trespassed onto the Stardust Hotel ... unless at the same time he was violating a justifi-
able expectation of privacy on [plaintiff's] part.").
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an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. 169
A recent California case, Sanders v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ,170 also in-
volved a PrimeTime Live reporter going undercover as an employee, this
time in order to investigate the "tele-psychic" industry. 171 The reporter was
assigned to work at an open, five-foot high, three-sided cubicle that afforded
a standing adult a view into most of the other cubicles in the room. 172 The
ABC reporter secretly videotaped conversations with tele-psychics that were
subsequently broadcast. 173 Two tele-psychics sued for invasion of privacy
and were awarded a judgment of $1.2 million against ABC. A state court of
appeals reversed, holding that the tele-psychics had no objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy.174 The court also held that secret videotaping was not
sufficient, by itself, to state a claim for the tort of invasion of privacy.175
Given precedents like Desnick and Sanders, Food Lion's claim that
the employees-only, behind-the-counter areas of its meat and delicatessen
departments are zones of privacy and personal autonomy appears to be quite
weak. Because Food Lion could not claim a legitimate expectation of privacy
in these areas, the proposed First Amendment "of most serious public con-
cern" standard would not apply. Alternatively, if Food Lion could demon-
strate that it had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the actions of the
PrimeTime Live reporters would be measured under the heightened "of most
169 See J.H. Desnick, M.D., Eye Servs., Ltd. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d
1345, 1352-53 (7th Cir. 1995).
170 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (Ct. App. 1997), review granted, 938 P.2d 1, 1 (Cal. 1997).
171 See id. at 596.
172 See id.
173 See id.
174 See id. at 598.
175 See id. Sanders alleged several different claims against ABC, but because the trial
judge found the portion of the broadcast concerning the plaintiff to be true and legitimately
newsworthy, only the claim for invasion of privacy went to the jury. See id. at 596. Al-
though the plaintiff testified that he believed his conversations with the reporter were con-
fidential, the jury found that he lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in
those conversations. See id. Nevertheless, the trial judge sua sponte instructed the jury re-
garding the "sub-tort" of "photographic invasion." See id. at The jury then returned a
verdict for the plaintiff totaling $1.2 million. See id. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded with instructions that judgment be entered for the defendants. See id. at 599.
The court held that because the plaintiff lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy, there could be no invasion of privacy and that there was no independent right to
be free from "photographic invasion." Id. The California Supreme Court has granted re-
view of Sanders. See Sanders, 938 P.2d at 1. The court will also be reviewing a claim for
invasion of privacy in which the victim of an automobile accident was filmed by a cam-
eraman on board the helicopter ambulance that carried her to the hospital. See Shulman v.
Group W Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434, (1996), review granted, 934 P.2d 1278 (Cal.
1997). The court of appeals held that the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy within the rescue helicopter but not at the accident scene. See id. at 449-53.
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serious public concern" standard. Even under this higher standard, it is likely
that the reporters would not be found liable because of the threat to the pub-
lic health and safety posed by the alleged unsanitary meat-handling practices
at Food Lion.
D. Limiting Excessive Compensatory Damages
The Supreme Court historically has expressed the concern that excessive
compensatory tort damage awards may burden First Amendment speech. 176
Compensatory damage awards against media defendants in newsgathering
tort cases may be substantial,1 77 particularly if damages assessed for news-
gathering torts include damages caused by ensuing tort-predicated publica-
tions. The Court has therefore limited awards of presumed general damages
in defamation actions involving "matters of public concern" because, like
punitive damages, such awards may chill protected speech. 178
1. The "Dietemann Approach"
Media speech that is both substantially truthful and of public concern nor-
mally receives a very high level of common law and constitutional protection
by virtue of its social value. As an example, take a hypothetical variation on
the fact pattern in Dietemann. 179 A private person in need of medical assis-
tance and not affiliated with the media visits the private home/office of a
faith healer. The faith healer's gratuitous prescriptions do not improve the
patient's condition but seriously worsen it. The patient writes a letter to a lo-
cal newspaper, a columnist interviews the former patient, and the newspaper
subsequently publishes a derogatory but substantially truthful story about the
faith healer. The faith healer then sues the newspaper on a variety of theo-
ries.
Under general common law principles, the substantial truth of the story
would furnish the newspaper with a complete defense to defamation and false
light depiction claims.180 A claim of alleged privacy invasion based on the
176 See supra Part II.
177 For example, the trial court in Sanders v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., awarded the
plaintiffs over $560,000 in compensatory damages and $525,000 in punitive damages. See
Kersis v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 23 Med. L. Rptr. 2321, 2321 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994).
Although the judgment was reversed in full on appeal, it is worth noting that the ratio of
compensatory to punitive damages was approximately 1: 1, and therefore a much higher
punitive damage award would not have offended due process under BMW's
"disproportionality" inquiry. See infra Part III.E.
178 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (noting that "the doc-
trine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion").
179 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
180 See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516 (1991) ("The com-
mon law of libel ... overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial
truth.").
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public disclosure of private and embarrassing facts would also be likely to
fail. Even if the faith healer did have a reasonable expectation of privacy
while providing medical treatment-a highly questionable assumption-the
claim would still fail: the truthful disclosure of a matter of legitimate public
concern does not normally provide the basis for an invasion of privacy
claim. 18 1
Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Florida Star v. B.J.F.,i82 if the
newspaper had published "lawfully obtain[ed] truthful information," s183 there
would be a strong presumption that the First Amendment would forestall the
imposition of any civil damages on the basis of that publication. 84 If, how-
ever, the newspaper had obtained the same information through the commis-
sion of newsgathering torts-as in Dietemann, where reporters pretended to
be in need of medical attention and then surreptitiously recorded their con-
versation with the faith healer-the newspaper might well find itself bereft of
both common law and constitutional protection from liability incurred in pur-
suit of substantially truthful information on a matter of legitimate public con-
'cern. 185 The publication itself, and not merely the newsgathering torts that
the reporters committed to produce it, would provide a possible basis for re-
covering damages for any harm resulting from publication.186 This is quite a
different matter from assessing damages against the media for the underlying
newsgathering tort itself. To put it another way, if we concede for the sake
181 See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that in-
vasion of privacy claim brought by public figures was subject to the "actual malice" stan-
dard of New York Times v. Sullivan); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir.
1975) (holding that the First Amendment affords the press no protection from invasion of
privacy claim where the information published is not "newsworthy"); Beresky v. Tesch-
ner, 381 N.E.2d 979 (I11. App. Ct. 1978) (affirming dismissal of invasion of privacy claim
brought by parents of deceased teenager on the grounds that newspaper article discussing
teenager's death by drug overdose addressed issues of legitimate public concern); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (noting that liability for public disclo-
sure of private facts may exist where the disclosure would be "highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person" and the matter disclosed "is not of legitimate concern to the public"). But
see Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv.
1205, 1258-62 (1976) (arguing that the principal element of the tort of public disclosure of
private facts is the shocking character of the disclosure, and that whether the matter is of
public concern is only one of several factors to be considered by the court).
182 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
183 Id. at 533 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
184 See id. (holding that the states may not punish the publication of lawfully obtained
truthful information absent a state interest of the highest order).
185 See infra Part IV.A.
186 See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971) ("No interest pro-
tected by the First Amendment is adversely affected by permitting damages for intrusion to
be enhanced by the fact of later publication of the information that the publisher improp-
erly acquired.").
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of argument that the media defendant should be held liable for newsgathering
torts, is it fair that it should also face liability for the publication ensuing
from those torts where that publication would not be independently action-
able because of common law or constitutional defenses?
There is significant judicial authority, ostensibly applying common law
principles of proximate cause, for extending the media's liability for news-
gathering torts to damages arising from the ensuing publications. 18 7 A num-
ber of cases-including most notably, Dietemann,88 and more recently, the
trial court's decision in Sanderst89-can be read as supporting this approach
to assessing damages. For simplicity, I will refer to this practice as the
"Dietemann approach." Where courts confronted with newsgathering tort
claims follow the Dietemann approach, media speech may be indirectly sub-
jected to tort damages solely by virtue of its origins, despite the fact that an
independent claim based on the speech itself might not be viable.
In Dietemann, the court could have distinguished three different but inter-
related causes of action, all sounding in invasion of privacy under California
law: (1) intrusion; (2) surreptitious electronic recording of conversations; and
(3) publication of true but embarrassing private facts. The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that, under California law, the surreptitious electronic recording was
itself actionable, regardless of whether there had been any publication. 19°
Once publication had been made, however, the court saw no First Amend-
187 See, e.g., id. (permitting publication damages to be assessed under a claim of intru-
sion upon seclusion); Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832, 842 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1979) (holding .that publication damages are available where information is obtained
by tortious means); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 781-82 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)
(stating that to bar a trespass plaintiff from recovering publication damages "would permit
the trespasser to enjoy the benefit of his tort without fully compensating [the] plaintiff for
his loss"). But see, Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("[Iln analyz-
ing a claimed breach of privacy, injuries from intrusion and injuries from publication
should be kept clearly separate."); Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92, 97 (App.
Div. 1970) (holding that reputational and emotional disturbance damages are not recover-
able under a claim for trespass); see also Rex S. Heinke, Added Damages for Publication
Should Not be Available in Intrusion- Trespass Cases without Independent Justification,
COMM. LAW., Summer 1983, at 6 (arguing that publication damages should not ordinarily
be available to plaintiffs who could not successfully bring publication-based tort claims);
King & Muto, supra note 155, at 935 (arguing in favor of adopting a rule which would
"den[y] recovery of damages for publishing information of public interest unless it is ob-
tained in a manner which, under developed tort principles, would warrant an award of pu-
nitive damages").
188 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
189 See Kersis v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 22 Med. L. Rptr. 2321 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1994), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (Ct.
App. 1997), review granted, 938 P.2d 1, 1 (Cal. 1997). See also supra notes 171-72 and
accompanying text.
190 See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 247.
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ment obstacle to permitting the plaintiff to recover damages for publication,
permitting such recovery on the theory that the publication exacerbated the
plaintiffs emotional distress. 191
Given its conclusion that publication was not necessary to the success of
the plaintiffs claim but that the plaintiff could nevertheless recover publica-
tion damages, the Dietemann court did not consider whether the defendant's
publication would have independently supported a claim of public disclosure
of private facts under California law. One element of that tort is that the in-
formation disclosed had previously been private.192 One wonders, though,
whether Dietemann could legitimately entertain any expectation of privacy
when offering free medical advice to total strangers.
Another element of the tort of public disclosure of private facts under
California law is that the information disclosed not be newsworthy.' 93 While
the Dietemann court's First Amendment discussion may be read as rejecting
any argument that the information obtained was of legitimate public con-
cern, 194 Dietemann's subsequent arrest for practicing medicine without a li-
cense 195 calls into question the court's inferences on this point. The fact that
the court could refer back publication damages back to the newsgathering
tort without considering whether the elements of a publication tort could be
independently satisfied illustrates how the Dietemann approach has the po-
tential to be used to circumvent the legal protections afforded to the media
against publication tort claims. 196
In cases where the courts permit jurors to assess publication damages
when there is no basis to assert an independent publication tort claim, the ef-
fect is clear. Media committing newsgathering torts will be more vulnerable
to excessive compensatory damage awards because their ability to raise
191 See id. at 250.
192 See Capra v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n of North America, Inc., 787 F.2d 463,
464 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating the elements of an invasion of privacy claim under California
law).
193 See id.
194 See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 250 ("A rule forbidding the use of publication as an
ingredient of damages would deny to the injured plaintiff recovery for real harm done to
him without any countervailing benefit to the legitimate interest of the public in being in-
formed." (emphasis added)).
195 See id. at 246.
196 The award upheld in Dietemann was a mere $1,000 general damages for injury to
the plaintiff's "feelings and peace of mind." Id. More troublesome is the recent decision
of Kersis v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., in which the trial court, applying California privacy
law, awarded the plaintiffs over $500,000 in compensatory damages. See Kersis v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 22 Med. L. Rptr. 2321, 2321 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994). The judgment
was reversed on appeal'and the California Supreme Court has granted review. See Sanders
v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (Ct. App. 1997), review granted, 938
P.2d 1,1 (Cal. 1997).
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common law and constitutional defenses will be impaired. 97
Although media defendants faced with newsgathering tort claims in courts
expressly adopting a Dietemann approach might request the judge to instruct
the jurors to take into account constitutional and common law defenses avail-
able in publication-based tort claims,198 it. is questionable whether this ap-
proach would provide adequate protection. Had the claims been tried sepa-
rately, the media defendants, through dismissal or summary judgment
motions, might have prevented the publication-related torts from going to the
jury altogether.
2. Separating Publication Injury from Newsgathering Injury
Even where courts decline to follow the Dietemann approach 99 and
attempt to distinguish newsgathering torts from publication torts for purposes
of damage assessment, there is still a risk that the jury will conflate the two
and award excessive compensatory or punitive damages. Willfully or uncon-
sciously, jurors often circumvent common law and constitutional limitations
on publication torts when they award reputational damages against the media
for newsgathering torts. This can occur because newsgathering torts and
publication torts may be difficult to segregate conceptually.
In assessing general compensatory damages, injuries sustained from the
newsgathering tort, as distinguished from publication harms such as com-
mercial embarrassment, loss of personal or professional reputation, and
emotional distress, are likely to be inextricably linked in the minds of jurors,
even when the jurors are given explicit instructions to guard against this con-
fusion. Although juries awarding punitive damages should focus on the rep-
rehensibility of the newsgathering tort alone, it is likely that they will also
take the harms stemming from the subsequent publication into account.
There is, therefore, considerable danger that juries will sub silentio follow
what the Dietemann court pronounced to be a formal rule: referring back the
injury from publication to the assessment of damages for the underlying
newsgathering tort. When juries do act in this manner they circumvent the
common law and constitutional defenses that protect the media from publica-
tion tort liability and run a considerable risk of awarding excessive damages.
When maverick juries adopt a Dietemann approach and award large damage
judgments, it becomes more difficult for trial and appellate judges reviewing
197 See King & Muto, supra note 155, at 943 (arguing that the potential for astronomi-
cal liability under the Dietemann approach forces self-censorship by the media and re-
stricts the dissemination of information on matters of public interest).
198 See id. at 948-49 (proposing that application of the Dietemann damage rule should
be limited to publications that are not of public interest).
199 See, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (noting that inju-
ries from intrusion and injuries from publication should remain separate); Costlow v.
Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92, 97 (App. Div. 1970) (holding that damages for trespass do
not include damages to reputation).
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their verdicts to determine whether the jurors, in awarding compensatory and
punitive damages, properly focused on injuries stemming from the newsgath-
ering torts alone, or whether the defendant's common law and constitutional
defenses were circumvented. Additionally, double recovery may result where
the jury considers publication injury when calculating newsgathering dam-
ages and the publication tort is later tried separately.
3. A Closer Look at Gertz
The proposed rule would forestall the formal inclusion of publication dam-
ages in any award of newsgathering tort damages and, lest the jury make
such an award without court direction, would require that all compensatory
damages for newsgathering torts be limited to recovery for actual injury from
the newsgathering torts proper, based upon competent evidence. This is the
same standard the Gertz Court adopted to rule out any award of presumed
damages where the allegedly defamatory statements related to a matter of
public concern and actual malice could not be proven with convincing clar-
ity. 200
Concededly, the analogy between excessive damage awards in constitu-
tionalized defamation and newsgathering torts is not perfect. Although puni-
tive and presumed damages, the categories of damages that are restricted in
Gertz-type defamation cases, 201 frequently account for high damage
awards, 202 it is nevertheless possible to recover significant compensatory
200 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974).
201 See id.; see also SMOLLA, supra note 97, §§ 9.05[2][c], 9.08[2][a], at 9-10, 9-16.2
(noting that Gertz's actual harm requirement forecloses any award of presumed damages
and that punitive damages are not recoverable absent a showing of actual malice in private
figure/public controversy cases).
202 See, e.g., MMAR Group, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 25 Med. L. Rptr. 1747, 1755-
56 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding, on post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, that
there was insufficient evidence of actual malice to support jury's award of $200 million in
punitive damages against publisher in defamation action but upholding an award of com-
pensatory damages of $22.7 million and punitive damages of $20,000 against an individual
reporter); see also Susan Borreson, Libel Blitz, TEX. L., Mar. 31, 1997, at 1 (noting that
the jury's verdict in MMAR was the highest libel award in U.S. history); id. (setting forth
the top ten defamation verdicts in Texas courts since 1980-all of which included punitive
damage awards of over $1 million). For examples of cases where large provable actual
damage awards were recoverable in defamation actions, notwithstanding plaintiffs' ability
or inability to prove actual malice, see Lundell Mfg. Co. v. American Broadcasting Com-
panies, Inc., 98 F. 3d 357, 364 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming jury award of $158,000 for lost
profits and $900,000 for damage to reputation); Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
83 F.3d 132, 137-38 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming an NASD arbitration award for defamation
of $728,250 in compensatory damages); Levine v. CMP Publications Inc., 738 F.2d 660
(5th Cir. 1984) (affirming award of $267,100 in actual damages); Park v. First Union
Brokerage Services, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1085, 1087 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (upholding an arbi-
tration panel award of $272,045 in actual damages and $500,000 in punitive damages);
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awards in Gertz-type defamation cases for actual injuries based upon com-
petent proof, even where there is no showing of actual malice. 203 By com-
parison, the exclusion of publication damages from actual damages for
newsgathering torts will significantly reduce the potential liability of the me-
dia.
E. Limiting Excessive Punitive Damages: Beyond BMW
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,204 the Supreme Court ruled that
excessive punitive damages violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Proc-
ess Clause. 205 The Court adopted a three-part test to determine whether a pu-
nitive damage award is unconstitutionally excessive. 206 The test directs courts
to examine punitive damage awards in light of three factors: (1) the "degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct;"207 (2) the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages; 208 and (3) "the civil or criminal penalties that could
be imposed for comparable misconduct. "209 Applying these factors to the pu-
nitive damages award in Food Lion, Judge Tilley granted remittitur, reducing
the total punitive damages from $5.5 million to $315,000, relying principally
on the disproportionality prong of BMW.210 The Food Lion jurors awarded
punitive damages that exceeded compensatory damages by a ratio of nearly
4,000:1, even though a ratio of 500:1 was deemed unconstitutionally dispro-
LeDoux v. Northwest Publishing, Inc., 521 N.W.2d 59 (Minn. 1994) (affirming jury
award of $676,000 in actual damages); Constant v. Spartanburg Steel Products, Inc., 447
S.E.2d 194 (S.C. 1994) (affirming jury verdict of $400,000 in actual damages and
$100,000 in punitive damages); First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d
696, 702 (Tex. App. 1980) (upholding award of $150,000 actual damages and $450,000
punitive damages); Winkel v. Hawkins, 585 S.W.2d 889, 899-90 (Tex. App. 1979)
(finding $500,000 actual and $200,000 punitive damages reasonable); Prozeralik v. Capi-
tal Cities Communications, Inc., 222 N.Y.S. 2d 913 (A.D. 4th Dept. 1995) (affirming
award of $6,000,000 for injury to reputation and 3,500,000 for emotional and physical
injury in defamation action); Eaton Vance Distribs., Inc. v. Ulrich, 692 So.2d 915 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming $625,000 in compensatory damages and reversing and
remanding $1,250,000 in punitive damages).
203 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350 (stating that although "all awards must be supported by
competent evidence ... there need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to
the injury").
204 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
205 See id. at 1592.
206 See id. at 1598.
207 Id. at 1599.
208 See id. at 1601.
209 Id. at 1603.
210 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 938
(M.D.N.C. 1997). In reducing the punitive damages awarded against the individual plain-
tiffs, Judge Tilley held that the BMW guideposts were not exclusive and relied upon ability
to pay rather than disproportionality. See id. at 939.
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portionate in BMW.211 After remittitur, however, the ratio was still nearly
225:1, a difference that, while less than that which the Supreme Court found
"grossly excessive" in BMW, 212 is still high by any reckoning.
Whether the media defendants' conduct in Food Lion was "reprehensible"
is debatable. 213 Indeed, neither the BMW decision nor subsequent cases2 14
clearly indicate whether a media defendant's newsgathering purpose in com-
mitting a tort should be taken into account. The Food Lion court held that the
First Amendment did not preclude the application of generally applicable
laws to the media for newsgathering torts. 215 The court did not factor into its
decision the reprehensibility inquiry of BMW or the potentially mitigating
fact that the torts were committed for the purpose of newsgathering. Nor did
the court find that the defendants' acts were particularly reprehensible, cer-
tainly not to the extent that would support an award of $5.5 million.216
The third BMW guidepost requires courts to compare the punitive
damage award to the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for
comparable misconduct.2 17 North Carolina has no criminal statute on its
211 See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1602-03. It should be noted that the disproportionality
might have been less striking if Food Lion's publication damages had been at issue. How-
ever, Food Lion did not sue for defamation. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
212 See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1598.
213 The jury might have had grounds for finding the defendants' behavior to have been
reprehensible because they were presented with evidence that the ABC reporters staged
various incidents. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 963
(M.D.N.C. 1997). Nevertheless, the trial judge in Food Lion ruled that none of the alleged
staged incidents could be deemed to be the proximate cause of the $5.5 billion in publica-
tion damages alleged by Food Lion. See id. at 966.
214 See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1599-1601 (noting that recidivism, as well as "deliberate
false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence of improper
motive" are properly considered in determining whether the defendant's conduct was rep-
rehensible); see also Cates Constr., Inc. v. Talbot Partners, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 569
(Ct. App. 1997) (observing that the BMW Court did not find the defendant's behavior par-
ticularly reprehensible because the damages were purely economic and the complained of
conduct did not endanger public health or safety).
215 See Food Lion, 984 F. Supp. at 932.
216 Considering each of the defendants separately, the court found that with regard to
Capital Cities' attorney, Jonathan Barzilay, "the evidence ... did not indicate that his ac-
tivities were particularly reprehensible." Id. at 937. Accordingly, and in light of the
"relatively minor involvement" of Capital Cities, it reduced Capital Cities' share of puni-
tive damages to $50,000. Id. at 938. The court also reduced the proportionate shares of
ABC and the individual plaintiffs-in part because they had relied on the legal advice of
Jonathan Barzilay, a fact which mitigated the reprehensibility of their actions. See id. at
938-39. The court levied most of the blame on ABC, finding that the deliberately false
statements made by ABC employees could be imputed to ABC. However, the court held
that these statements could not support such a disproportionate award and therefore re-
duced ABC's punitive damages to $250,000. See id.; see also supra note 149.
217 See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1603.
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books that levels a fine of $5.5 million for fraud in an employment applica-
tion, nor does state law provide for comparable civil penalties. For example,
the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, under which the Food Lion
defendants were charged, provides for no more than an award of treble dam-
ages.218 In his discussion of this third guidepost, Judge Tilley notes that
North Carolina recently enacted a statute limiting punitive damage awards to
three times the amount of compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is
greater. 219 Nevertheless, because the statute did not apply retroactively,
Judge Tilley found that it did not "provide much guidance in this case."220
Even though the Food Lion punitive damage award was reduced un-
der BMW, the verdict nevertheless raises the question of whether the media
should not be afforded greater First Amendment protection. 221 BMW pro-
vides a rule of general applicability for cases in which no fundamental rights
are at stake. Although some punitive damage awards will not be so excessive
as to offend due process under BMW, they may still be of such a magnitude
as to burden First Amendment rights. Media defendants may argue that their
tort-generated speech should be entitled to a high level of First Amendment
protection, requiring that any burden placed on that speech be narrowly
drawn in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest. 222 The minor
newsgathering torts often necessary to the production of valuable speech
should at least be afforded some protection other than low-tier, rational basis
review. 223 An intermediate standard of First Amendment review may well be
218 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1997); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994) (providing
that individuals who submit false claims to the federal government may be liable for a civil
penalty of between $5,000 and $10,000, plus treble damages).
219 See Food Lion, 984 F. Supp. at 936 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § ID-1 (1996)).
220 Id. Interestingly, Judge Tilley also stated that fraud is punishable by incarceration in
both North and South Carolina. See id. He then rejected ABC's contention that none of the
fraud statues in either state were applicable to it because the statutes required proof of in-
tent "'to cheat or defraud the victim of money or something of value.'" Judge Tilley wrote
that the "something of value" in this case included: "jobs; wages; ... time taken to train
employees ... [and] the right to make hiring decisions based on accurate information."
Id. Judge Tilley continued: "When criminal sanctions are involved, monetary sanctions
necessarily pale in comparison. Therefore, the legislative judgment that actions not en-
tirely remote from the actions here punishable by imprisonment weighs in favor of allow-
ing much of the monetary sanction to stand." Id. (emphasis added). Despite Judge Tilley's
assessment that ABC's acts were not "remote" from acts that might have been punishable
as fraud in North or South Carolina, no criminal prosecution was instituted in either state,
suggesting that state prosecutors may have taken a different view.
221 See Food Lion, 984 F. Supp. at 931 (holding that the First Amendment provided
ABC with no immunity from punitive damages).
222 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) ("[W]here a newspaper pub-
lishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may be imposed, if
at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order .... ").
223 Where a fundamental liberty is not burdened, due process requires only that a law
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appropriate. 224 Under such a standard, it is conceivable that a large punitive
damage award could pass muster under Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
but still run afoul of the First Amendment.
Media defendants who advocate a First Amendment immunity argue that
large damage awards like those in Food Lion chill investigatory reporting.
They claim that the media serves a unique watchdog function in our society
as guardians of the First Amendment and that courts should take judicial no-
tice of this function. If these arguments are accepted, then courts should ex-
pressly acknowledge the constraints the First Amendment places on state tort
law. A more forceful and unambiguous approach to this problem would pro-
vide greater protection to free speech than leaving media defendants with
only a BMW due process defense. A clear approach would also provide more
protection than expressly incorporating First Amendment concerns into the
application of the BMW reprehensibility indicium.
A better rule would be to hold that where a media defendant charged with
a newsgathering tort meets certain requirements, it should enjoy complete
immunity from punitive damages. 225 This immunity would be conditioned on
a finding that the newsgathering tort not be of a particularly egregious or
outrageous nature. 226 The media's purpose in conducting the investigation
should play a large part in a court's assessment of whether particular conduct
is egregious or outrageous. In this regard, it is worth noting that in Diete-
mann, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, em-
phasizing that "defendant's efforts were directed toward the elimination of
quackery, an evil which has visited great harm upon a great number of gulli-
ble people. "227 In Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS, 228 an award of $250,000 in puni-
tive damages against CBS for noisy and obtrusive trespass into the plaintiff's
restaurant was vacated by the trial judge. 229 The appeals court ordered a new
trial so that CBS would have the opportunity to present evidence that its mo-
tive in committing the torts was to bring attention to the fact that the restau-
rant had recently been cited for several health code violations. 230
The acts complained of in Food Lion are arguably less blameworthy than
rationally further a valid governmental purpose. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152-54 & n.4 (1938).
224 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (A content-neutral regula-
tion will be sustained "if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the in-
cidental, restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.").
225 See supra notes 121-58 and accompanying text.
226 See supra Part III.C.1.
227 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925, 932-33 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
228 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1978).
229 See id. at 833.
230 See id. at 817-18.
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the disruptive conduct involved in Le Mistral or the intrusion into a private
residence involved in Dietemann. ABC's motive of investigating unsanitary
food handling procedures at a major supermarket chain is at least as compel-
ling, in terms of the public interest served by the investigation, as that of
CBS in Le Mistral, where previously cited health code violations could have
been publicized without disruptive intrusion. ABC's motive was also more
compelling than that of the media defendant in Dietemann, because relatively
few people would have been affected by Dietemann's gratuitous quackery,
while the health of hundreds, if not thousands, of unsuspecting consumers
might have been adversely affected by unsanitary meat handling procedures
discovered at Food Lion.
ABC could have met all of the conditions prerequisite to an entitlement to
the proposed First Amendment immunity. The problem with the Food Lion
jury verdict was not merely that the punitive damages awarded were exces-
sive in light of BMW, but that any punitive damages were awarded at all. 231
If speech is both substantially truthful and of significant public concern, if
the tort is not unusually reprehensible, and if the media reporters have not
themselves significantly contributed to the targeted behavior, then punitive
damages should be subject to review under a First Amendment rule more re-
strictive than the due process rule of BMW and, under certain circumstances,
entirely precluded.
IV. APPLYING CURRENT FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES TO THE PROPOSED
MODEL OF EXCESSIVE DAMAGE LIMITATION
A. Does the Newsgathering Tort "Taint" the Ensuing Speech? Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co. and Florida Star v. B.J.F.
The critical question raised by Dietemann is whether newsgathering torts
should be viewed as "tainting" the ensuing speech so as to divest it of the
First Amendment protection that it would otherwise enjoy. If the torts do
taint the speech, then media defendants will not be able to raise the First
Amendment as a bar to publication damages. In such cases, the tort-tainted
speech might be divested of First Amendment protection, even if sued upon
directly. Alternatively, if the torts do not taint the speech, the use of a
Dietemann approach could be viewed as a circumvention of any First
Amendment protection of the tort-predicated speech.
Even where media publications are truthful and of public concern, under
231 The trial record might have supported a jury finding that ABC's reporters actively
and deliberately participated in creating the unsanitary food-processing conditions that they
were supposed to be investigating-that they had staged various incidents. See Food Lion,
Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 963 (M.D.N.C. 1997). If the record reasonably supported such a
finding, the jury would be justified in penalizing journalistic misbehavior with an award of
punitive damages. However, the award should have been only a small fraction of the $5.5
million awarded to Food Lion.
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current law they may receive little or no effective First Amendment protec-
tion where the media obtains the information published by committing news-
gathering torts. The Supreme Court's ruling in Florida Star protects the pub-
lication of "lawfully-obtained truthful information about a matter of public
significance," 232 prohibiting states from punishing such publication unless the
punishment is "narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order"233 -
a high-tier, "strict scrutiny" test. Nevertheless, while the Court has yet to
address the issue squarely, it is possible that the Court will not consider tor-
tiously obtained information to be lawfully obtained information for purposes
of invoking the Florida Star rule against a Dietemann approach to damage
assessment.
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,234 the Supreme Court upheld a promissory
estoppel judgment against a newspaper that violated an oral agreement not to
reveal the identity of a confidential informant. 235 The informant, a public re-
lations consultant to Minnesota's 1982 Independent-Republican gubernatorial
candidate, turned over court records indicating that the rival-ticket candidate
for lieutenant governor had been charged with three counts of unlawful as-
232 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 (1989) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail
Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)). In Florida Star, the Supreme Court held that the
media defendant could not be held liable under a Florida statute which made it unlawful to
"print, publish or broadcast... in an instrument of mass communication,' the name of
the victim of a sexual offense." Id. at 526, 541. B.J.F., a rape and robbery victim, sued
for civil damages based on a violation of this statute after the defendant published her
name in its newspaper, having obtained it from a police report of the investigation posted
in a press room to which the media had access. See id. at 527-28. The Florida Star Court
relied on a line of precedent sustaining the practice of publishing of truthful information
obtained from court documents and public records. See id. at 530-31. The Court cited
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979), for the proposition that
'[ilf a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public signifi-
cance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.'" Florida Star, 491 U.S. at
533. The majority also stated that the story about the crime was newsworthy. See id. at
536-37. The dissent took issue with the Court's conclusion, arguing that the name of the
crime victim was not similarly newsworthy-a criticism that this author shares. See id. at
550 (White, J., dissenting); SMOLLA, supra note 97, § 10.0412][a], at 10-31.
Perhaps sensing that it had the weaker side of this argument, the Florida Star majority re-
phrased the Daily Mail rule-alluding only to the protection of "truthful information...
lawfully obtained" and omitting any reference to "matters of public significance." Id. at
541. In this respect, Florida Star is significant in that it leaves the media to determine for
itself what is "of public significance." However, inasmuch as Florida Star specifically re-
lies upon the rule of Daily Mail, I will assume, for purposes of this Article, that the
"public significance" requirement is part of the Florida Star rule.
233 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541.
234 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
235 See id. at 665..
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sembly in 1969 and convicted of petit theft in 1970.236 Upon investigation,
the newspapers discovered that the court documents were authentic, but that
the unlawful assembly charges arose out of a civil rights demonstration and
the conviction for petit theft was based on an incident that occurred when the
rival candidate was emotionally distraught and which was later vacated. 237
Cohen lost his job when the newspaper editors, over the protests of the re-
porters who had made the promises, revealed his name in the ensuing arti-
cle. 238 At trial Cohen recovered $200,000 in compensatory damages and
$500,000 in punitive damages, although the punitive damages award was re-
versed by an intermediate state appellate court.239 The Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed the compensatory damages award, holding that a claim of
promissory estoppel was inappropriate to the circumstances of the case and
that the First Amendment prevented recovery of the $200,000 judgment. 240
The Supreme Court, by a 5 to 4 vote, reversed. Justice White, in the ma-
jority opinion, emphasized the state's interest in the neutral enforcement of
its laws, writing that "generally applicable laws do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has inciden-
tal effects on its ability to gather and report the news." 241 In what is arguably
dicta, 242 Justice White specifically rejected the newspapers' Florida Star de-
fense, noting that in Florida Star, the rape victim's name had been obtained
by lawful means, whereas "respondents obtained Cohen's name only by
making a promise that they did not honor. "243
If the Court in Cohen would not consider information obtained through
breach of contract to be lawfully obtained for purposes of First Amendment
protection under Florida Star, it might well take the same view regarding in-
formation obtained by means of newsgathering torts. The state's interest in
the neutral enforcement of generally applicable laws encompasses both tort
and contract. Media defendants who publish substantially truthful informa-
236 See id.; see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989).
237 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665-66.
238 See id. at 666.
239 See id. The court of appeals reversed the misrepresentation claim. The plaintiff was
thus only entitled to recover compensatory damages under his remaining breach of contract
claim. See Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 260.
240 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 204, 205 (Minn. 1990).
241 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
242 See O'Neil, supra note 140, at 1012 ("So brief a reference offers at most a hint that
the Cohen majority saw the matter of newsgathering conduct as potentially relevant to re-
solving a close case, even where that conduct could surely not be called 'unlawful' in any
conventional sense."). The decision in Cohen may have turned on the theory that the de-
fendants had waived their First Amendment rights. See infra note 298 and accompanying
text.
243 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671.
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tion of public concern obtained by means of newsgathering torts may not
have the benefit of high-tier Florida Star protection, against either a suit
premised directly on the publication or against a newsgathering tort claim
brought in a court adopting a Dietemann approach to damage assessment.
B. The "Gertz/Sullivan Circumvention" Doctrine and its Limitations
Although Justice White's opinion in Cohen casts doubt on the ability of
media defendants to raise the rule of Florida Star to protect substantially
truthful tort-predicated speech of public concern, it does leave open the pos-
sibility of indirectly protecting such speech-under a doctrine that prevents
circumvention of the constitutionalized defamation rules of Gertz and Sulli-
van. Given the possible adverse implications of the Cohen dicta for tort-
predicated speech, it is not surprising that the Desnick and Food Lion courts
invoked these anti-circumvention principles for the benefit of media defen-
dants where the plaintiffs were unwilling or unable to prove the falsity of the
tort-predicated publications, let alone the actual malice requirements of
GertzlSullivan.
Anti-circumvention doctrine relies heavily on the Supreme Court's
decision in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.244 That case arose when Hus-
tler Magazine published a satirical depiction of the Reverend Jerry Falwell,
founder and president of the Moral Majority, which portrayed the Reverend
Falwell's first sexual experience as a "drunken, incestuous rendezvous with
his mother in an out house. 245 A Virginia jury rejected Falwell's claim for
defamation on the theory that no reasonable person would have taken the
parody to be an assertion of fact. Nevertheless, the jury awarded Falwell
$100,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 246 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
judgment. 247
Reversing the judgment below, the Supreme Court extended Sullivan and
its actual malice requirement to public officials and public figures who claim
intentional infliction of emotional distress, emphasizing the need "to give
adequate 'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amend-
ment. 248 In so doing, the Hustler Court had, as one commentator expressed
244 485 U.S. 46 (1988). For analyses of the Court's decision, see generally Paul A.
LeBel, Emotional Distress, The First Amendment, and "This Kind of Speech": A Heretical
Perspective on Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 315 (1989); Robert C.
Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1990); Rodney
A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. Fal-
well, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423 (1988).
245 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 48.
246 See id. at 49.
247 See id.
248 Id. at 56.
1998]
BOSTON UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW
it, prevented an "end-run around" Sullivan.249
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Cohen, argued, inter alia, that the award
of promissory estoppel damages represented a similar circumvention of the
constitutional defamation rules and that Hustler was "precisely on point.-25o
Justice White, writing for the Cohen majority, distinguished Hustler by citing
the Minnesota Supreme Court's observation that Cohen could not have sued
for defamation because the information disclosed-his name-was true. 25'
White emphasized that "Cohen is not seeking damages for injury to his
reputation or his state of mind."252 Rather, Cohen was suing for breach of
contract and the resultant loss of job and lowered earning capacity. 25 3
White's attempt to distinguish Cohen from Hustler might provide a way to
avoid the implication in Cohen that protected speech can be "tainted" by
newsgathering torts. In fact, Judge Tilley used this very distinction to rebuff
Food Lion's attempt to use a Dietemann approach. Food Lion had invoked
Cohen in support of its argument that, given the nature of ABC's alleged
wrongful acts, Food Lion should be entitled to recover both reputational and
non-reputational damages resulting from the broadcast, regardless of whether
the information published by ABC was true or false. 25 4 Focusing on Justice
White's statement in Cohen,255 Judge Tilley concluded that "[wihere ... a
plaintiff seeks to use a generally applicable law to recover for injury to
reputation or state of mind while avoiding the requirements of a defamation
claim (requiring proof of falsity and actual malice)."256 the controlling
precedent should be Hustler and not Cohen.257 Finding that Food Lion was,
249 Michael J. Gerhardt, Liberal Visions of the Freedom of the Press, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1025, 1030 n.26 (1992) (book review).
250 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 674-76 (1991) (Blackmun, J. dissent-
ing).
251 See id. at 671.
252 Id.
253 See id. But see id. at 675 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I perceive no meaningful
distinction between a statute that penalizes published speech in order to protect the indi-
vidual's psychological well being or reputational interest and one that exacts the same pen-
alty in order to compensate the loss of employment or earning potential.").
254 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 822-23
(M.D.N.C. 1995).
255 See id. at 822.
256 Id. at 823.
257 See id. But see Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 932
(M.D.N.C. 1997) ("Despite the many protections necessary for the proper operation of
the press, it would be a peculiar rule indeed which immunized illegal activity, undertaken
with a consciousness of wrongdoing, from punishment and deterrence through punitive
damages." (footnote omitted)). The court based its decision to deny ABC's First Amend-
ment defense to the punitive damages award on ABC's "consciousness of wrongdoing."
Id. The court equated this level of intent with the higher threshold dictated by Gertz,
which "provides protection for a member of the press who acts negligently or without in-
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at least in part, attempting to avoid the First Amendment restrictions on a
defamation action which it had not brought, Judge Tilley ruled that Food
Lion could not recover any publication damages for injury to its reputation as
a result of the defendants' broadcast. 258
Judge Tilley was certainly correct in recognizing that Food Lion's pro-
posed use of a Dietemann approach and its reliance on Cohen to recover
damages for reputational injuries in an action based on newsgathering tort
claims represented the same kind of end-run around the Gertz/Sullivan prin-
ciples that the jury verdict in Hustler did. The more difficult question, how-
ever, is whether the Gertz/Sullivan circumvention principles of Hustler af-
ford a doctrinal basis for extending comprehensive First Amendment
protection to truthful publications of public concern that are tainted by news-
gathering torts.
One problem with using anti-circumvention doctrine to protect newsgath-
ering torts is the difficulty of extrapolating a comprehensive rule from the
implications of a doctrine specifically designed to protect speech that might
be false and defamatory, and whose language is specifically shaped to that
purpose. If Hustler's extension of the Sullivan rule to intentional infliction of
emotional distress might have distorted the concept of "actual malice," at
least the Court was acting upon a careful evaluation of the First Amendment
principles at stake in political satire.
By comparison, if anti-circumvention theory is systematically used to ex-
tricate the investigatory media from a Dietemann approach to damage as-
sessment for the newsgathering torts, as in Food Lion, query whether that
would permit a comparable judicial focus either on the societal interest in
deterring certain types of newsgathering torts but not others, or on the so-
cietal value of the tort-predicated speech. As to the latter, anti-circumvention
theory presently does not distinguish between truthful and false tort-
predicated speech. Where actual malice cannot be proved with clear and
convincing clarity, the Gertz/Sullivan circumvention rule protects speech that
may be false, defamatory, socially worthless, and perhaps even "doubly tor-
tious" because it was generated by means of newsgathering torts.
Moreover, anti-circumvention theory makes no distinction between minor
and more serious newsgathering torts. Reinterpreting "actual malice" for this
purpose would cause much greater doctrinal confusion than Hustler did, be-
cause there is not necessarily any correlation between the types of newsgath-
ering tort, the media's good faith or lack thereof when employing it in an in-
vestigation, the truth or falsity of any resulting publication, and the media's
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.
A related problem is that anti-circumvention theory remains ill-defined and
conceptually troublesome, and its precise application to actions for news-
tent to violate generally applicable laws." Id. It is, however, difficult to see why any in-
tentional tort would not be subject to punitive damages under such a standard.
258 See id.
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gathering torts remains unclear. Although the theoretical reach of the doc-
trine might be broad, courts seem most comfortable invoking it when the
plaintiff's intention to circumvent the constitutional defamation rules might
be proved or inferred from the facts. Because anti-circumvention doctrine is
specifically keyed to a constitutional defamation rule, courts are more likely
to invoke it when the pleadings present an obvious nexus to defamation, such
as an allegation of false publication or injury to reputation. Where one such
obvious nexus to defamation is absent, the presence of the other may suffice
to alert the court to the problem of Gertz/Sullivan circumvention.
For example, in Hustler, injury to reputation was no longer at issue be-
cause the jury thought the falsity of the heavy-handed political satire so obvi-
ous that it could not be understood as defamatory statement of fact. Accord-
ingly, the plaintiffs recovery was limited to the injury caused by emotional
distress. An earlier case that may be viewed as an effort by the Court to pre-
vent circumvention is Time, Inc. v. Hill,25 9 in which the Court extended the
rule of Sullivan to false light depiction cases. This case troubled some com-
mentators who believed that the tort of false-light was more closely related to
invasion of privacy than to defamation. 260 As in the case of Hustler, defama-
tion was not an issue in Hill261 because, although the alleged falsifications
(regarding the treatment of the plaintiffs when held hostage by escaped con-
victs) were embarrassing and emotionally disturbing, they were clearly not
damaging to reputation. Both Hustler and Hill arguably present
Gertz/Sullivan circumvention problems in that the plaintiffs sought recovery
for state of mind injuries-humiliation, emotional distress, embarrassment-
injuries that are either thought to be less serious than reputational injuries or
that are usually recoverable as defamation injuries, and thus subject to
Gertz/Sullivan limitations. As a practical matter, however, the Court might
have been more directly clued to Sullivan's applicability by the presence in
both cases of a more conspicuous nexus to defamation-the allegation of fal-
sity.
In Food Lion, by comparison, falsity was not alleged, but the other obvi-
ous nexus to defamation-injury to reputation-was an issue in the case.
Judge Tilley therefore recognized that Food Lion's attempt to link its reputa-
259 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
260 See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REv. 935,
956-63 (1968) (arguing that the Court wrongly equated privacy and defamation in Hill).
But see Richard A. Epstein, A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a Natu-
ralistic Ethic, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 665, 668 (1980) (arguing that "false light is but a small
corner of the tort of defamation that in no sense needs its own niche in the law of pri-
vacy").
261 See Hill, 385 U.S. at 390-91 (noting that because the case was not a libel action, the
question of what standard to apply to reputational injuries to private individuals was not
before the Court).
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tional injuries to the damages caused by the newsgathering torts without
proving falsity or actual malice was, in fact, an attempt to circumvent Gertz
and Sullivan.
Problems emerge, however, when the challenged speech lacks either obvi-
ous nexus to defamation, as would be the case where falsity is not alleged
because the speech is conceded to be truthful and where injury- to reputation
is not alleged but rather some lesser state of mind injury, such as emotional
distress, is at issue. Speech with these attributes might theoretically be pro-
tected under a Gertz/Sullivan circumvention analysis: if Gertz/Sullivan pro-
tects false and defamatory speech, then it should protect truthful speech; if
Gertz/Sullivan would have protected the same speech were it alleged to have
caused injury to reputation, then it should also protect that same speech when
a lesser or included state of mind injury such as emotional distress is alleged.
In practice, however, such speech might not even be recognized as pre-
senting a Gertz/Sullivan circumvention problem, since there is no obvious
nexus to defamation which would suggest that the plaintiff is engaging in cir-
cumvention strategy and the defamation-specific language of Gertz/Sullivan
would appear inapposite. Thus, ironically, categories of speech that are sub-
stantially truthful and of public concern-speech deserving and normally re-
ceiving the highest level of First Amendment protection-would be less
likely to be viewed as falling within the scope of anti-circumvention doctrine
and afforded First Amendment protection against a Dietemann approach to
damage assessment, if only because the allegations look so unlike classic
defamation.
Substantially truthful speech of public concern-the usual end-product of
media undercover investigations-should not have to seek protection in the
theoretical back-waters of doctrines specifically designed to protect defama-
tory speech. It would be more effective, logical, and jurisprudentially sound
for speech that is both substantially truthful and of public concern to find
shelter under the high-tier protection afforded by the affirmative rule of
Florida Star.
C. Distinguishing Newsgathering Torts from Promissory Estoppel
Notwithstanding Justice White's statements in Cohen concerning how in-
formation is or is not "lawfully obtained," newsgathering torts can be func-
tionally and conceptually distinguished from the promissory estoppel at issue
in Cohen so that media speech which is substantially truthful and of signifi-
cant public concern, albeit tortious in origin, can be afforded the benefit of
high-tier First Amendment protection under the rule of Florida Star. The
Cohen decision itself suggests one significant difference: in distinguishing
Florida Star and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. 262 from Cohen, Justice
262 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (finding that a state statute which prohibited the publication of




White writes that "the State itself defined the content of publications that
would trigger liability"; whereas in Cohen, "Minnesota law simply requires
those making promises to keep them. The parties themselves, as in this case,
determine the scope of their legal obligations, and any restrictions that may
be placed on the publication of truthful information are self-imposed. "263
Contracts and promises were thus viewed by the Cohen majority as self-
imposed limitations under which First Amendment rights are voluntarily
waived. In contrast, the civil action in Florida Star was predicated on the
violation of a state statute under which the state itself defined and imposed
liability on the basis of the content of speech. Although the majority of
newsgathering tort claims are more likely to be based on state common law
than on state statute, in either case it is the state that imposes tort liability.
Tort liability should therefore be distinguished from contractual liability
arising from a voluntary waiver of First Amendment rights.
A second distinction between newsgathering tort law and con-
tract/promissory estoppel law is the large difference in impact that each law
has on the overall flow and volume of protected speech. The Cohen majority
made the cogent argument that enforcing state contract and promissory es-
toppel laws in order to protect informants would, in the long run, augment
the volume of valuable speech because confidential sources would feel more
secure in confiding to the media. 264 No comparable argument can be made
for awarding large damage judgments against the media in the newsgathering
tort cases. Such large damages only serve to chill investigatory journalism
and the valuable speech it produces. Indeed, the need for First Amendment
protection is greater in the case of newsgathering torts than it is where Co-
hen-type promissory estoppel is involved. Because reporters generally will
not voluntarily name an informant in breach of a pledge of confidentiality,
such promissory estoppel claims arise infrequently. 265 By comparison, news-
gathering torts are common and are, arguably, necessary to investigatory
journalism so that litigation based on them will arise more often.
Another distinction is that it is much more likely that the media will be
subjected to large punitive damage awards when they commit newsgathering
torts than when they are sued on a theory of promissory estoppel. In cases of
breach of contract or promissory estoppel, punitive damages are normally
limited to situations where contract-related torts, such as fraud, are impli-
263 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670-71 (1991).
264 See The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REv. 177, 283-
85 (1991) (noting that Cohen will increase the stock of information because informants
will be more willing to disclose information when their identities are protected from dis-
closure).
265 But see Smolla, supra note 97, § 12.06[3], at 12-38.2 (noting that although Cohen
may seem of little consequence because few journalists will voluntarily reveal the identity
of their sources, it may be of greater significance regarding various subsidiary agreements
such as how the information will be used).
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cated. 266 Indeed, in Cohen itself an award of $500,000 in punitive damages
was reversed by the appeals court which concluded that Cohen had failed to
establish the fraud claim that would have supported such an award under
Minnesota law. 267 In contrast, there is a far greater likelihood of large puni-
tive damage awards in newsgathering tort cases-a cause of concern here, as
it was in Sullivan.
A final distinction between a Cohen promissory estoppel claim and a
newsgathering tort claim is that publication completed the plaintiff's cause of
action in Cohen, whereas newsgathering torts are severable and distinct
claims that may be conceptually distinguished from publication torts, even if
that distinction is not so readily apparent to jurors adopting a Dietemann ap-
proach to damages assessment. Thus the states' interest in the neutral en-
forcement of their tort laws can be successfully vindicated by trying news-
gathering torts separately from publication torts while insisting that the juries
confine their verdicts to damages flowing directly from newsgathering.
The publication-based claims should be analyzed as distinct from the
newsgathering-based claims for First Amendment protection purposes. If the
published speech is found to be truthful and of public concern, it should then
be eligible for the high-tier First Amendment protection of Florida Star,
notwithstanding Cohen's narrow view of how information may be "lawfully
obtained." Individuals could still pursue an independent publication tort ac-
tion, but that claim would be subject to the First Amendment protection of
Florida Star, Sullivan, and Gertz.
There are thus a number of compelling reasons, in terms of vindicating
First Amendment interests, for distinguishing newsgathering torts from the
promissory estoppel in Cohen. Substantially truthful media speech which is
of public concern should be able to claim the high-tier First Amendment
protection of Florida Star, even if it is tortious in origin, and notwithstanding
Cohen's implication that such information might not be "lawfully obtained."
Such high-tier First Amendment protection should check the effect of poten-
tially inflated compensatory and punitive damages that arise from the Diete-
mann approach.
D. Tort-Predicated Publications That Are Proven to be False
In the earlier discussion of constitutionalized defamation,268 the strongest
argument for extending First Amendment protection to the media for news-
gathering tort liability was that newsgathering torts normally are committed
in order to generate truthful speech of public concern. But if the speech is
false and defamatory, should either the speech or the tort have the benefit of
266 See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 189-92 (1990)
(noting that punitive damages are not ordinarily awarded for breach of contract but that
they may be awarded where there is fraudulent conduct or an independent tort).
267 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
268 See supra Part II.
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First Amendment protection if actual malice cannot be proven with convinc-
ing clarity as required by Gertz/Sullivan?
While it may be troubling to protect such doubly tainted speech, the First
Amendment should still prevent courts from using a Dietemann approach to
damage assessment if actual malice cannot be shown. Gertz/Sullivan and
anti-circumvention principles still protect the publication itself, and this pro-
tection should not be forfeited even if the media commit newsgathering torts.
Courts should not adopt the Dietemann approach because the inclusion of
publication damages in a newsgathering tort award would indirectly under-
mine the First Amendment protection of the publication by subjecting the
media to large damage awards. Similarly, courts should require that any
compensatory damages awarded for newsgathering torts be limited to actual
injuries supported by competent evidence to ensure that the jury has not con-
flated newsgathering damages with publication damages.
Punitive damages are, however, another matter. Unlike the proposal to
prohibit the award of compensatory damages under a Dietemann approach,
the proposed punitive damages immunity is not derivative of the protection
the First Amendment currently affords to the publication. Instead, prudence
dictates that such immunity be granted so as not to discourage media investi-
gations that are designed to produce substantially truthful speech on matters
of public concern. If no such speech results but the information published is
defamatory, the rationale for protecting the newsgathering torts proper
against any award of punitive damages- is lost. Media defendants in this posi-
tion should instead look to BMW for due process relief from "excessive" pu-
nitive damages.
E. Heightening the "of Public Concern" Requirements of Florida Star and
Gertz/Sullivan
The central focus in considering First Amendment protection for news-
gathering torts is on the tension between the public's legitimate need for in-
formation and the target's legitimate need for privacy or personal autonomy.
Many commentators, this author included, believe that the Florida Star Court
defined "of public concern" too broadly when it held that the name of the
rape victim, and not merely the fact of the crime, was "of public con-
cern." 269 By comparison, Gertz's "of legitimate public concern" require-
ment, as expounded upon in Dun & Bradstreet, is arguably too narrow if it
excludes information directly bearing on the credit status of a corporation.270
Perhaps the discrepancy between the two cases can be reconciled by
viewing the Florida Star rule as protecting substantially truthful speech and
269 See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 97, § 10.04[2][a], at 10-31 (stating that it was not
clear that the victim's name in Florida Star was newsworthy).
270 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority holding that a credit report was not a
matter of public concern within the meaning of Gertz).
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by viewing Gertz as protecting speech that may be false and defamatory.
However, for purposes of First Amendment protection of tort-predicated
speech, the constitutional standard should be closer to Gertz, requiring that
the matter reported be not merely "of public concern," but "of significant
public concern." A broad definition of this requirement would encompass all
politically relevant information but exclude the merely morbid, prying, and
sensational. Media defendants meeting this heightened requirement would be
insulated from punitive damages as well.
Where the media obtains the published information by tortious intrusions
into zones of privacy or personal autonomy, such as a home, then the requi-
site standard should be elevated an additional step, and First Amendment
protection limited to matters "of the most serious public concern." Such
might include, among other things, evidence of felonious conduct; corruption
of public officials; dangers to our federal, state, or local governments and
their democratic institutions; and activities or conditions otherwise dangerous
to the public safety.
Applying these heightened "of public concern" standards to some of the
major precedents produces consistent outcomes. In Dietemann, for example,
if we accept for the sake of argument the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that
plaintiffs home was a place with a heightened expectation of privacy, even
given that he had invited virtual strangers into an office within that home, the.
information obtained through tortious intrusion was still arguably "of signifi-
cant public concern" because practicing medicine without a license is a
crime. It is doubtful, however, whether the defendants' disclosure would
have met the requirements of the proposed "most serious public concern"
standard. The crime was not a felony, the plaintiff prescribed no illegal
drugs, and sought no remuneration for his advice. Any threat to public health
was relatively limited since the number of individuals who voluntarily sought
Dietemann's advice was small. Furthermore, they sought his advice knowing
that he was not a licensed physician. Therefore, if one accepts the court's
finding that Dietemann could legitimately entertain an expectation of privacy
under the circumstances presented by that case, the First Amendment should
not have forestalled the Dietemann court from using the approach to damage
assessment that it did.
On the other hand, the proposed rule would support the different outcome
in Pearson v. Dodd,27' where members of a Senator's staff stole confidential
files from a file cabinet in the Senator's office and turned them over to the
defendant newspaper columnists. While the file cabinet was arguably a zone
of heightened privacy and personal autonomy, the stolen correspondence
supported allegations of influence-peddling against the Senator. Because the
matter disclosed was "of the most serious public concern," the First
Amendment should have forestalled use of a Dietemann approach to damages
assessment, even if the court of appeals had not reached the same result by
271 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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common law analysis. 272
As for Food Lion, the evidence confirming the existence of unsanitary
meat-handling procedures in a major, multi-state supermarket chain was not
only "of significant public concern," it was "of the most serious public con-
cern." Even assuming for the sake of argument the dubious proposition that
the non-public areas of Food Lion's business premises-areas which were
frequented by numerous employees-were areas in which Food Lion could
legitimately entertain a heightened expectation of privacy, the "of most seri-
ous public concern" standard would still have been met. The tort-predicated
publication appeared to be substantially true, and Food Lion balked at prov-
ing otherwise in court.273 Thus, the modified Florida Star rule I have pro-
posed should protect ABC's non-criminal newsgathering torts, as well as the
tort-predicated publication, against the assessment of excessive damages.
If media defendants cannot meet the proposed heightened "of public con-
cern" requirements, should they be ineligible for all of the proposed First
Amendment protections from excessive damage awards? Arguably, the un-
modified Florida Star and Gertz/Sullivan rules already protect the publica-
tions, but such protections would be indirectly undermined if publication
damages were assessed for the predicate torts. While I have argued that mi-
nor newsgathering torts do not taint the ensuing publications so as to forfeit
First Amendment protection, imposing heightened "of public concern" re-
quirements as a precondition to forestalling the inclusion of publication dam-
ages would hold the media to account for their tortious acts. Media defen-
dants who fail to meet the heightened "of public concern" requirements
should be denied the proposed conditional immunity from punitive damages
and left to seek relief under BMW.
CONCLUSION
As Food Lion illustrates, the significant First Amendment issue regarding
newsgathering torts is not that of media liability, but rather, of excessive
damages. Although states have a strong interest in the neutral enforcement of
their tort laws, and plaintiffs have an interest in recovering compensatory
damages, these concerns must be balanced against the strong societal interest
in investigatory journalism and its frequent production of substantially truth-
ful publications on matters of significant public concern. These interests can
be accommodated by recognizing a limited and conditional First Amendment
immunity for the media from punitive and excessive compensatory damages
272 The court of appeals ruled that the defendant newspaper columnists could not be
held liable for intrusion, despite their knowledge of how the documents had been obtained.
See id. at 705. In any case, the court made clear that it would not consider publication
damages in its assessment of intrusion damages. See id.
273 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 959
(M.D.N.C. 1997) (noting Food Lion's failure to contest the truthfulness of the
broadcast by bringing a libel suit).
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for newsgathering torts, broadly analogous to the damage limitation model
created in constitutionalized defamation under the rule of Gertz v. Robert
Welch.
Realization of this model requires clarification and modification of present
First Amendment doctrine. Most importantly, the possible implication of
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.-that tortiously acquired information is not
"lawfully-obtained"-should be rejected and the high-tier First Amendment
protection of Florida Star extended under specific conditions to speech
predicated on non-criminal newsgathering torts. This, together with a height-
ening of Florida Star's "of public concern" requirement (to discourage tor-
tious media behavior in pursuit of mere sensationalism as well as media in-
trusions into zones of personal privacy and autonomy), will do much to
resolve current doctrinal inconsistencies in First Amendment jurisprudence
while accommodating the conflicting interests at stake.
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